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AN ISSUE-DRIVEN STRATEGY FOR
REVIEW OF AGENCY DECISIONSt
Charles H. Koch, Jr.*

ustice Scalia, the first administrative law scholar to sit on the Supreme
Court since Felix Frankfurter, began his dissent in NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc.: "The Court makes heavy weather out of what is, under
well-established principles of administrative law, a straightforward case." 1
That observation should give any administrative law specialist pause because
courts, including the Supreme Court, and advocates regularly cast about in
a fog of ignorance where the light of "well-established principles of administrative law" is readily available. 2 Sure enough, this case could be resolved
by the application of the principles governing the scope of review of administrative action. These principles have existed for generations. Indeed, justice
Frankfurter, in the famous Universal Camera 3 opinion involving the very
same agency, found those principles to be well established more than forty
years ago and incorporated by reference through the Federal Administrative Procedure Act (F APA).
Yet there is evidence that Justice Scalia has overstated the case in this
instance. He dissented from a majority opinion confirming the judgment

J
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*Woodbridge Professor of Law, College of William and Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of
Law: LL.M. 1975, University of Chicago; J.D. 1969, George Washington University; B.A.
1966, University of Maryland. I would like to acknowledge the generous assistance of Peter
Strauss and Paul Verkuil.
I. 110 S. Ct. 1542, 1557 (1990) (Scalia,]., dissenting).
2. This seems a propitious opportunity to mention that my two-volume treatise on administrative law has a good deal about "well-established administrative law principles." 2 C. KocH,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE (1985) [hereinafter KOCH and the 1990 supplement
KocH SuPP]. I apologize in advance for citing myself but, at least, I have tried to use it for
further discussion rather than in support of myself.
Also appearing frequently:
Breyer,judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363 (1986).
Fallon, Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article Ill, I 0 I HARV. L.. REV. 915
(1988).
Levin, Identifying Questions of Law in Administrative Law, 74 CEO. L.J. I (1985).
McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administrative Resolution of Science Policy
Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 CEO. L.J. 729 (1979).
Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706. [hereinafter FAPA].
Uniform Law Commissioners' Model State Administrative Procedure Act (1981) [hereinafter MSAPA].
3. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
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of a Fifth Circuit judge, Jerre Williams, whose administrative law credentials are impeccable. 4 What can explain this fundamental disagreement
between these two administrative law experts? The answer lies in the fact
that, while there are undoubtedly relevant well-established principles, they
are not equal to the task. The law governing the extent of review of administrative decisions simply fails in complex cases. This article explores the
reasons for the failures of the current principles and suggests formalization
of principles that have been evolving through cases such as Curtin Matheson
in which the well-established principles prove insufficient. 5
Justice Scalia accused the majority of ignoring well-established principles
but, in fact, the majority followed well-established, if not formalized, judicial practice. When faced with a complex review assignment, sophisticated
courts usually construct an issue-driven review strategy that transcends the
simplistic system contemplated by formalistic administrative law and incorporated in the F APA. This issue-driven strategy allows the courts to define
their role both more flexibly and with more precision and hence enables
them to meet the needs of the complex modern relationship between the
judiciary and the bureaucracy. 6
The strategy recognizes that any given administrative decision incorporates the resolution of a bundle of issues. Because of the variety of substantive areas dominated by the administrative process, a fundamental strategy
based on particular substantive questions would be impossible. Instead, the
law has evolved a strategy towards a few basic, and accepted, categories of
issues: policy, fact, law, procedure, and discretion.

4. The majority reversed the judgment of the Fifth Circuit in Curtin Matheson Scientific,
Inc. v. NLRB, 859 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1988), to which Judge Williams dissented. Among
other credentials, Judge Williams was an administrative law scholar at Texas and the first
chair of the Administrative Conference of the United States.
5. Levin, supra note 2, at I ("Scope-of-review ... has always been one of the principal
whipping boys of administrative law.").
6. In its formative years, the administrative process was expected to overcome the defects
discovered in the three constitutional branches. James Landis, its strongest advocate, argued:
The administrative process is, in essence, our generation's answer to the inadequacy of the
judicial and the legislative processes. It represents our effort to find an answer to those
inadequacies by some other method than merely increasing executive power. If the doctrine
of the separation of power implies division, it also implies balance, and balance calls for
equality. The creation of administrative power may be the means for the preservation of
that balance, so that paradoxically enough, though it may seem in theoretic violation of
the doctrine of the separation of power, it may in matter of fact be the means for the
preservation of the content of that doctrine.
j. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 46 (1938).
In modern times, however, we see the defects in the administrative process as well and,
hence our search for shared power is more practical than theoretical. E.g., Strauss, The Place
of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573
( 1984); Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions-A Foolish
Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488 (1987); Verkuil, The Status of Independent Agencies
After Bowsher v. Synar, 1986 DUKE L.J. 779.
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I. THE PARADIGM

Curtin Matheson provides a useful vehicle for exploring the issue-driven
strategy because at least one of its opinions confronts each issue category. 7
Each opinion, even Justice Scalia's, pursues an issue-driven strategy. Moreover they do so in a context administrative law theory would contend should
be easy: formal adjudication by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).
The Supreme Court reviewed the NLRB's decision that Curtin Matheson
committed an unfair labor practice by discontinuing its recognition of a
Teamsters local. 8 The union had been the collective-bargaining agent until
a strike in 1979. During the strike, the company hired a number of replacement workers and several employees returned to work. The company
contended that it had a good faith belief that the union no longer represented the employees and therefore refused the union's settlement offer.
The union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board. 9
An administrative law judge (ALJ) dismissed the charges but the Board
reversed and held that the company lacked a sufficient objective basis to
question the union's support. 10 In doing so, the Board continued the process of reversing a long-standing "rule" that allowed employers to presume
that replacement workers would not support the union. 11 Instead, the Board
adopted a case-by-case approach in which the employer would be required
to provide evidence that the union lacked the support of the replacement
employees. 12 The Fifth Circuit refused to enforce the Board's order and
rejected the Board's decision not to accept any presumptions about the views
of replacement employees. 13 The Supreme Court took the case to resolve
a split in the circuits.
Justice Marshall, writing for three other Justices and the Court, reversed the
Fifth Circuit and upheld the NLRB. His review strategy was based on his finding that the Board, rather than the courts, was primarily responsible for labor
policy. 14 Courts then are required to uphold the agency's policy decision if "it
is rational and consistent with the Act." 15 Justice Marshall found that the Board's
change of policy was based on its long experience and was not irrational. Also,
the NLRB's decision was consistent with the "overriding policy" of "industrial
peace." 16 Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred but observed that the NLRB's

7. NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 110 S. Ct. I542 (1990).
8. /d.
9. /d. at I547.
IO. /d.
II. See, e.g., Station KKHI, 284 N.L.R.B. 1339 (I987), enforced, 891 F.2d 230 (9th Cir.
1989).
12. II 0 S. Ct. at 1548.
13. /d.
14. /d. at 1549.
15. /d.
16. /d. at 1553.
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new rule "press[es] to the limit the deference to which the Board is entitled
in assessing industrial reality." 17
Justice Scalia wrote the primary dissenting opinion, with Justice Blackmun making some separate observations. 18 Justice Scalia, as evidenced by
the quote introducing this article, tried to contend that the judicial role was
well established and that the majority had not performed its well-defined
role. Superficially, Justice Scalia followed his contention that the case merely
required the application of the well-established word formula review standard of "substantial evidence." 19 One understanding of that test requires
"more than a scintilla" and Justice Scalia found "not a shred of affirmative
evidence" to support the NLRB. 20 The more widely used understanding
looks for reasonableness. 21 Justice Scalia concluded: "On those facts, any
reasonable fact finder must conclude that the respondent possessed, not
necessarily a certainty, but at least a reasonable, good-faith doubt, that the
union did not have majority support. " 22
Justice Marshall and Justice Scalia disagreed largely because they disagreed as to the kinds of issues under review. Justice Marshall found the
crucial issues to be ones of policy and reviewed them according to the judicial role with respect to policymaking. He also held that the Board "acted
within its discretion" and its decision was "consistent with the Act." 23 Justice
Scalia believed the crucial issues to be ones of fact and proceeded to review
the Board's determination according to the judicial role with respect to factfinding.24 In his separate dissent, Justice Blackmun raised questions about
the adequacy of the procedures. 25 In play then were all the major issue
categories: policy, fact, law, procedure, and discretion. From this base, we
can explore how these judges, and others, defined their role according to
types of issues and the advantages of doing so.
II. REVIEW OF POLICY
Justice Marshall and the Court reviewed ·the Board's judgment "as a
matter of policy. " 26 Judge Williams also found himself guided by his finding
that policymaking was at issue:
The simple phrase "substantial evidence," however, does not completely describe
the standard of review in this particular case where we consider not only the
Board's factual conclusions but also its evolving policy ....
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

/d. at 1554 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
/d. at 1555 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
/d. at 1557 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

/d. at 1560 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2 KOCH, supra note 2, at § 9.4.
II 0 S. Ct. at 1560 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
/d. at 1553-54.
/d. at 1557 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
/d. at 1556 (Biackmun, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1546.
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A great degree of deference is owed to the Board's policy choices ... Y
As recognized by Judge Williams and the majority of the Supreme Court,
there are well-established administrative law principles that define review
of administrative policymaking. His protest to the contrary, Justice Scalia
was compelled himself to recognize and treat separately the policymaking
elements in the Board's decisions. What should the review strategy be if the
validity of the decision does depend on policy issues?
Although modern government is expected to provide a variety of services, the fundamental purpose of government is to further general societal
goals. 28 Government decisions aimed at advancing or protecting collective
goals of the community is policymaking. 29 The agency exercises its policymaking authority when it, rather than some other authority, properly makes
these collective decisions. 30 Of course such decisions may be based on factfinding31 but they are not factual.:12 As has often been observed, in our
complicated society the legislative branch cannot perform all or perhaps
even a major part of this function. 33 Thus, agencies often receive major
policym·aking functions. 34
Generally agencies dominate the resolution of policy issues. Theoretically, the political authority retains control; the courts traditionally acquire
27. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc. v. NLRB, 859 F.2d 362, 368 (5th Cir. 1988) (Williams,

J., dissenting).
28. "The ultimate test of the administrative is the policy that it formulates; not the fairness
as between the parties of the disposition of a controversy on a record of their own making .. ,
J. LANDIS, supra note 6, at 39.
29. See Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1057, 1058-59 (1975) reprinted in R.
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81 (1977). Policy decisions are based on aggregate
values; they do not focus on individual goals or on the resolution of individual situations.
Obviously, the two are somewhat interrelated but it is possible to separate those decisions
that reflect general or societal goals from other types of decisions. See generally id. at 106770 (types of rights).
30. Thus distinguishing such decisions from decisions about law. See infra notes 139-40
and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 94-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of review of general
facts.
32. Arr'y GEN. COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, FINAL REP. 117 (1941) jhereinafter FINAL REP.].
33. See generally Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions,
I J .L. ECON. & ORG. 81 ( 1985). But see Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court
Give It Substance?, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1223 (1985).
34. G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN & H. BRUFF, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 29-30 (2d
ed. 1980) ("[o]ne of the original justifications for agencies [is] the development of policy.");
Tomain, Institutionalized Conflicts Between Law and Policy, 22 Hous. L. REV. 661, 663 (1985).
See also R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO, & P. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 364
(1985) ("It is often impossible for an agency or a reviewing court to discern from the language
of a statute or it. legislative history how Congress intended an agency to resolve policy issues
inherent in scient •. ;c uncertainty."); Levin, supra note 2, at 22 ("But the agency is expected
tt'l use its own creativity in determining what weight to attach to these various factors under
the circumstances of the particular regulatory program. In doing so, the agency is not interpreting the legislative will but, instead, responding to a legislative invitation to make law. This
aspect of the administrative decision, therefore, does not support independent review by the
court.") (emphasis in original).
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only a limited role. Thus, policymaking is in reality left to the bureaucracy.
As Justice Marshall observed: "This Court has emphasized often that the
NLRB has the primary responsibility for developing and applying national
labor policy." 35 The same could be said of nearly every agency acting within
its own substantive area. For this reason, as judge Williams concluded: "A
great degree of deference is owed to the Board's policy choices . .' .. " 36
Several reasons exist to continue this special restraint in the issue-driven
strategy.
Policymaking implicates all the aspects of expertise. Administrative agencies, as all of the opinions in Curtin Matheson recognize, have a special claim
on expertise. Foremost, tasks are assigned to the administrative process
rather than the courts because agencies embody special expertise. Thus an
agency's policymaking expertise constitutes a conscious allocation of functions cautioning the courts against undue interference.
In addition to systemic justification for restraint are operational justifications. Generally expertise includes superior capacity for compiling the
information in support of policymaking. Experts identify necessary information and understand how to synthesize the information. Even if judges
have the capacity to accumulate and evaluate specialized information, they
cannot make expert use of that information in the same way as an expert
administrative officiaiY When the legislature has made the choice to rely
on expert judgments, the generalist courts should meticulously avoid
circumventing the legislative choice. 38 Thus when policymaking is assigned
to the administrative process, courts must assure that this assignment has
meaning. 39
Another reason for choosing the administrative process is the availability
of superior and diverse procedures. Judicial procedures are designed to
resolve individual controversies and hence judges confront policy choices
only in narrow and biased contexts. On the other hand, administrative
procedures can be designed to compile the information and views necessary
for uniform decisions.
The judicial process has nothing equivalent to the administrative rulemaking processes. Using traditional rulemaking procedures, an agency must
give public notice of its regulatory plans and offer some opportunity to
comment, often orally as well as in writing. 40 Rulemaking allows administrative policymakers to seek out information and comments in a way that
judges cannot. Also, rulemaking engages both technical experts and political decisionmakers directly in the decision. Although a trial may permit
35. NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 1542, 1549 (1990).
36. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc. v. NLRB, 859 F.2d 362, 368 (5th Cir. 1988) (Williams,
J., dissenting).
37. See generally McGarity, supra note 2 (science policy questions).
38. See Devins, Regulation of Government Agencies Through Limitation Riders, 1987 DUKE L.J.
456,499.
39. Fallon, supra note 2, at 935-36.
40. I KOCH, supra note 2, at ch. 4.
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testimony from experts and even political actors, a judge cannot involve
such people in the actual decisionmaking. At the appellate level, where most
policy questions might be resolved, the competence of the judicial process
is more questionable. Indeed, much of Justice Scalia's concern relates to
administrative law's grudging acceptance of the NLRB's failure to use rulemaking, that is, the process specifically designed for sweeping fact-finding
and broad participation, when making policy.
True, the NLRB in the case reviewed in Curtin Matheson made policy
through trial-like or "formal" adjudication and thus chose a process with
many of the policymaking defects of a trial. 41 Administrative adjudication,
however, has the flexibility to be a policymaking vehicle superior to a judicial proceeding. Even in adjudication, an agency can and often does provide
for broader intervention than judges in a judicial proceeding. 42 An agency
may seek out a broad range of comments in adjudication when it finds the
need to engage in policymaking in such proceedings. Indeed, the NLRB
has used this method quite successfully. 43 Judges find it much more difficult
to obtain expert assistance. They hear only conflicting testimony from
experts chosen by the parties; they may not use experts to help them with
the decision making. 44 In reality the judicial process is designed to prevent
open communication between judges and experts. The attributes of a
generalist merge with ignorance to substantially impede informed policymaking. Agency adjudicators, often themselves quite expert, can compel
the appearance of experts to help and have experts available to assist in the
decisionmaking itself.
New policy affects those engaging in the practice at the time the policy
becomes effective. Not only is the judicial process incapable of seeking broad
participation, denying participation to those affected, but it makes policy
in the case at hand. Thus the parties are affected by policy decisions nonexistent at the time they engaged in the practice. The Supreme Court has
objected to the retroactive application of administrative rules 45 but it regularly engages in retroactive policymaking. Indeed, it can act no other way.
Agencies, however, can make prospective policy, 46 and hence, administrative policymaking is likely to be more fair than judicial policymaking. When
agencies act prospectively, the courts should be very reluctant to substitute
41. As Justice Scalia observed, N LRB adjudications are "even more judicialized than ordinary formal adjudication .... " NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 1542,
1558 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
42. See Gardner, Federal Courts and Agencies: An Audit of the Partnership Books, 75 CoLUM.
L. REV. 800 (1975).
43. For example, the administrative case at issue in NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394
U.S. 759 (1969), was the famous Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966), where
the NLRB used adjudication to make a "rule" but, in the course of doing so, it did solicit
participation from nonparties who would be affected. 394 U.S. at 763.
44. But see Fed. R. Evid. 706.
45. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988).
46. I KocH, supra note 2, at § 6.58 (agency can act prospectively in adjudication as well
as rulemaking). [But the judiciary may make prospective decisions also, see id.J
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their reactive policymaking. Justice Scalia's concluding objection is to the
Board's making policy in the guise of fact-findingY At least the Board had
a choice; judges must make policy in the guise of deciding a specific case.
Perhaps the major factor counseling judicial restraint in reviewing policymaking is uncertainty. A policy choice is made necessarily under conditions of uncertainty, sometimes extreme uncertainty. Policymaking is by
nature prospective and incorporates some judgments about the future, about
the impact on human behavior, and other intangible factors. Because of
this uncertainty, we tend to evaluate the "wisdom" of a particular policy
rather than its support. Not only did the legislature ordain that the agency's
judgment respecting these uncertain conditions should be dominant, but
the agency was structured to make such choices. If various aspects of expertise are merged with political consideration, then the agency structure will
reflect this mixture in a way that courts will not.
The danger of this uncertainty is that courts can justify extreme interference. The agency has difficulty proving the correctness of its policy
choices and hence such choices are always open to criticism. 48 A court that
wishes to arrogate power can use this opening to do so. Thus it is essential
that courts allow agencies policymaking freedom and not require more
support and justification than is possible under the particular conditions of
uncertainty. 49 When an agency undertakes policymaking assigned to it, the
courts should avoid becoming too deeply involved because of its inherent
disadvantages in expertise, process, and considering uncertainty. 50 A court
must discontinue its evaluation of policy choices at the point at which it
concludes that the agency has undertaken careful and complete
decisionmaking. 51
47. NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 1542, 1566 (1990) (Scalia,].,
dissenting).
48. Breyer observed:
Given the uncertainties and complexities ... , it may appear perfectly reasonable to an
engineer to rest a decision ... on an inspired guess. That same decision might appear
irrational to a judge to whom the parties have explained how much time, effort, and money
that inspired guess will cost them. Judges may not fully appreciate the agency's need to
make decisions under conditions of uncertainty.
S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 117 (I 982).
49. McGarity, supra note 2, at 809 ("Because an agency need not act with the same degree
of certainty that characterizes pure scientific investigation, courts engaged in substantive
review of agency decisions on science policy questions should never demand such certainty.").
50. Breyer expressed "nagging doubts" that the courts improve policymaking. Breyer,
supra note 2, at 395; see also Fallon, supra note 2, at 920.
51. Nonetheless, this can be a rather hefty review as noted by Diver:
Reviewing courts have insisted that agencies probe the implications of their policy choices.
Not only must administrators attend to consequences suggested by public comment; courts
will also frequently require them to seek out and analyze other possible consequences of
their actions. Although most courts do not demand explicit quantification unless the statute so requires, several have nonetheless called for a qualitative comparison of good and
bad consequences. Even if the courts have not universally endorsed specific analytic techniques, they have typically demanded a thorough and expansive approach ....
Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393, 417-18 (1981)
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Ill. THE RELEVANCE OF THE PROCESS
In Curtin Matheson, 5 2 neither Justice Marshall nor Justice Scalia was sufficiently careful in dealing with the implications of NLRB's method of
proceeding. The controversial administrative decision was not so much the
case at hand but the policy made by the Board in a prior adjudication,
Station KKH/. 53 Justice Marshall referred to this as a "rule" for which the
very limited arbitrariness review standard should be applied. 5 4 Justice Scalia
noted that the Board made this policy through formal adjudication for which
the more severe substantial evidence or reasonableness standard is appropriate.55 To what extent should the method used to make policy affect the
kind and level of review?
To understand this conflict, it is necessary to confront another review
strategy: the word formula system. This system relies on certain phrases to
communicate the desired level of review. Although several phrases have
been used over the years, three have become established for those agency
decisions which are reviewable. The three word formulas are "de novo,"
"substantial evidence," and "arbitrary or capricious." 56 Although these
phrases lack concrete definition, they have meaning in terms of relative
severity of judicial scrutiny .57 I have attempted to define them in terms of
tolerance for risk of error. 58 Except in the most rigorous system, even
correctness must be viewed in terms of acceptable risk of error. 59 Thus, a
court applying the most demanding word formula, usually called de novo
(what I call agreement review), asks whether in its judgment the agency's
solution has the least risk of error as among all competing solutions.fi° From
this word formula, the other two standards each express a descending scrutiny for error. In this system, a court operating under the de novo standard
is to tolerate less risk of error than one operating under the substantial
(footnotes omitted).
Although Judge Leventhal's hard look doctrine might be applied to a variety of issues, it
seems well suited to policymaking. See Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983
Sur. CT. REV. 177, 181; see also Sunstein, In Defense of the Hard Look: Judicial Activism and
Administrative Law, 7 HARV.j.L. & PUB. POL'Y 51,53-54 (1984).
52. IJOS.Ct.l542(1990).
53. 284 N.L.R.B. 1339 (1987), enforced, 891 F.2d 230 (9th Cir. 1989).
54. 110 S. Ct. at 1549.
55. /d. at 1558 (Scalia, J ., dissenting).
56. 2 KocH and 2 KocH SUPP., supra note 2, at § 9.6.
57. A formula for judicial review of administrative action may afford grounds for certitude but cannot assure certainty of application. Some scope for judicial discretion in
applying the formula can be avoided only by falsifying the actual process of judging or
by using the formula as an instrument of futile casuistry .... But a standard leaving an
unavoidable margin for individual judgment does not leave the judicial judgment at large
even though the phrasing of the standard does not wholly fence it in.
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474,488-89 (1951).
58. 2 KOCH, supra note 2, at§§ 9.3-9.7.
59. E.g., J. PETERSON, THE MATHEMATICAL TOURIST, 31, 107 (1988).
60. The de novo formula means that the court should uphold the agency only if it agrees
with the agency decision. The court may give "deference" to the agency but ultimately it
must be convinced the agency is right.
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evidence standard and one operating under that standard less than one
operating under the arbitrary standard. 61
Schotland provides a. less concrete but perhaps more realistic approach.
He observed that the word formulas describe "mood-points. " 62 That is, various standards tell the court the critical attitude with which it should approach
a particular administrative decision.
Most of the controversies in the application of the word formula system
involve a conflict between the substantial evidence standard and the arbitrariness standard. 63 Under the tolerance concept, the arbitrariness standard requires a greater tolerance for risk of error than the substantial
evidence standard. 64 In terms of Schotland's mood-points, the substantial
evidence and arbitrariness standards require emotionally opposite judicial
conclusions. The substantial evidence standard requires the court to reach
the positive conclusion that the agency's decision is reasonable. The arbitrariness standard requires the court to reach the negative conclusion that
the agency's decision is not arbitrary. By upholding the agency under the
former, the court expresses some sense of approval, whereas in upholding
the agency under the latter, the court expresses no more than that it was
not offended by the administrative decision. Under this concept of the word
formula system, the context in which the decision is made does not affect
the level of review.
The reviewing court must determine which standard applies and then
obey the mandates of that standard. 5 5 Although the word formula system
works in the simple review cases, it often fails in the complex review situations.66 The system evolved during a simpler era when the vast majority
of administrative decisions involved economic regulation and resulted from
a few well-established procedural models. 67 It has not matched the evolu61. Operationally, there is a crucial break between de novo or what I call agreement review,
testing for correctness, and the other two standards. 2 KOCH, supra note 2, at 90. For example, the substantial evidence word formula requires a test for reasonableness. Although this
standard appears a term of art, in ordinary speech, we regularly rely on the difference between
examination for correctness and that for reasonableness. E.g., BEYOND NUMERACY: RUMINATIONS OF A NUMBERS MAN 54 (1991) (As a math teacher, "I usually give full credit for
wrong answers if only the 'math' is wrong but the concept is correct, and partial credit if the
approach is a reasonable one.").
62. Schotland, Scope of Review of Administrative Action-Remarks Before the D.C. Circuit judicial Conference, 34 FED. B.J. 54,59 (1975).
63. Levin, Scope-of Review Doctrine Restated: An Administrative Law Section Report, 38 ADMIN.
L. REV. 239 (1986).
64. See infra notes 188-89 and accompanying text discussing the "abuse of discretion"
word formula. In terms of the degree of judicial scrutiny, the abuse of discretion word formula
conveys the same level of judicial review as the arbitrariness standard.
65. E.g., Aircraft Owners & Pilots Ass'n v. FAA, 600 F.2d 965,969-70 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
66. Levin, supra note 2, at 9-13. A valiant effort to reform the word formula system was
undertaken by the ABA's Administrative Law Section. See Levin, supra note 63.
67. Decisions that were challenged in court generally were the result of formal adjudication. The substantial evidence test served the purpose of telling the courts to do less review
than that of a lower court under the "clearly erroneous" test. It also admonished the courts
not to substitute judgment by conducting de novo review. The distinction between substan-
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tion of the administrative process and the diversification of the administrative state.
The word formula system lacks flexibility. The system leads a court to
evaluate an entire administrative decision, no matter how complex, under
a single review standard. Substantial evidence is applied to the entire decision resulting from formal, trial-like processes and arbitrariness is applied
to decisions resulting from any informal process. Indeed, when informal
agency action, both rulemaking and adjudication, became more prevalent,
many commentators contended that the standards had meaning only in terms
of the nature of the administrative procedure and the record it. produced. 68
Commentators found that substantial evidence review and arbitrariness
review were indistinguishable when applied to an informal record. Future
Justice Scalia advocated this approach. 69
tial evidence and arbitrariness worked because it expressed the distinction between review
of facts found through formal adjudication and review of facts and policymaking undertaken
through rulemaking. See FINAL REP., supra note 32, at 117-20.
68. Judge Friendly's opinion might have been the first judicial adoption of this approach:
The respondents ask us to apply a standard of review less severe than the substantial
evidence test. They point to what they consider an anomaly in subjecting notice and
comment rulemaking, which has here produced a regulation essentially legislative in nature,
to the substantial evidence test, which under the AP A, 5 U .S.C. § 706(2)(E), applies only
to determinations resulting from adjudication, 5 U.S.C. § 554, and rules "required by
statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing," 5 U .S.C.
§ 553(c) ....
While we have felt constrained to determine and sustain the applicability of the substantial
evidence test, it may well be that the controversy is semantic in some degree, at least in
the context of informal rulemaking, and that it lacks the dispositional importance that
respondents imply ....
In WBEN, Inc. v. United States, while we applied to F.C.C. rulemaking the "arbitrary and
capricious" standard of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), it is hard to see in what respect we would
have treated the question differently if we had been applying a "substantial evidence" test.
Associated Indus. v. Department of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 347-49 (2d Cir. 1973) (citation
omitted).
69. Association of Data Processing Serv. Org. v. Board of Governors, 745 F.2d 677, 68486 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Justice Scalia adopted this view well before he took his place on the
bench:
A consumer product safety rule promulgated by the Commission under Section 9 is
judicially reviewable in a court of appeals under Section II. The rule cannot be affirmed
"unless the Commission's findings under subsection 9(c) are supported by substantial
evidence on the record taken as a whole." For the purposes of this provision, "record" is
defined in a fashion which is to our knowledge unique in legislative draftsmanship, and
perhaps in human contemplation:
"For purposes of this section, the term 'record' means such consumer product safety
rule; any notice or proposal published pursuant to section 7, 8, or 9; the transcript required
by section 9(a)(2) of any oral presentation; any written submission of interested parties;
and any other information which the Commission considers relevant to such rule."
The obvious purpose and effect of the last clause is to make "record" include that which
in lawyerly and even common parlance would more precisely be described by the term
"non-record." This verbal absurdity is more than accidental; it reveals a basic problem
that has developed in the judicial review of informal rulemaking.
The two most frequently applied statutory bases for setting aside agency action, findings,
and conclusions are (I) the determination that they are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
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As evidenced by Curtin Matheson, this approach robs the review system
of both flexibility and precision. For example, Justice Scalia felt compelled
to apply the heightened judicial scrutiny of the substantial evidence test to
agency policymaking because the policymaking occurred in a formal adjudication. Following his view of the traditional word formula system, he would
have applied the less demanding arbitrariness standard to policymaking
through rulemaking. 70
Under this review strategy, the judicial role is tightly structured: formal
record means the entire decision must be tested for reasonableness; informal record means the entire decision must be tested for arbitrariness. This
strategy lacks technique for more flexible and precise delineation of the
judicial role. How would Congress, for example, prescribe heightened scrutiny for selected rulemaking if courts felt free to ignore the statutory standard of review because of the nature of the record? How could judges
themselves evolve more sophisticated review strategies?
Either Congress or the courts, for example, might determine that certain
policy determinations should be reviewed in the same matter whether the
agency makes the determination in adjudication or rulemaking. 71
The process-oriented word formula system may also be too superficial in
defining the review of different types of rules. One of the most venerable
principles of administrative law is that legislative rules, those made pursuant
to statutory authority, have the force of law and are binding on the courts
unless arbitrary but nonlegislative rules, interpretative rules, and general
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law"; and (2) the determination that they
are "unsupported by substantial evidence in a case ... reviewed on the record of an agency
hearing provided by statute." While the former is applicable to review of all agency action,
the latter is an additional rigor imposed upon on-the-record adjudication and rulemaking-that is, in those instances the action must not only be shown to be not arbitrary,
capricious, abusive of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law, but also must
be shown to be a reasonable action on the basis of the evidence adduced in the required
proceedings and without reference to extrinsic evidence that the parties had no opportunity to refute. This scheme is entirely rational, and is indeed essential to the distinctive
character and purpose of an on-the-record proceeding.
What appears to have happened, however, is that the "substantial evidence" test has
acquired a vague reputation as the more demanding of the two without appreciation of
the fact that it is only rationally applicable to an "on-the-record" proceeding. As a result,
it has in recent legislation apparently been included when Congress has desired particularly
"tight" review, without reference to whether the reviewed proceeding was "on the record."
This mistakes the nature of the standard. The essential constraint of the "substantial
evidence" test is not that it requires a higher degree of support for an agency determination (the arbitrary and capricious standard itself would probably be violated by a determination made on the basis of insubstantial evidence) but rather, that it requires this support
to be contained within the confines of the public record made pursuant to the provisions
of sections 556 and 557 of the Administrative Procedure Act. If there are no such confines,
there can be no such constraint ....
Scalia & Goodman, Procedural Aspects of the Consumer Product Safety Act, 20 UCLA L. REV.
899, 933-35 (1973) (footnotes omitted).
70. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 40-41
(1983).
71. See generally Diver, supra note 51.
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statements of policy are not binding because they are not the direct result
of the delegated authority to make rules. 72 The distinction is justified by
the absence of express authority and public procedures in the promulgation
of non legislative rules. As to certain types of issues, however, the vast difference in the review of these types of rules may be too great. Certain types
of policy choices, for example, may justify limited review even if announced
in a nonlegislative rule.
The nature of each issue resolved by the decision and not the nature of
the process should define the judicial role. If the review system is to rationally allocate decisionmaking functions, it must do so according to all the
factors affecting the relative decisionmaking advantages of the courts and
the bureaucracy and not just the nature of the administrative decisionmaking process. While process advantages must be part of the computation,
those advantages alone should not be controlling. The system should not
compel a judge to review, say, a particular type of policy choice lightly if it
happens to be made in informal rulemaking, more severely if made in formal
adjudication and still more severely if made in another type of rulemaking. 73 The search for the appropriate level of review must reach beyond
the decisionmaking process.
The word formula strategy is too simplistic to adequately express the
complex relationships between the courts and the bureaucracy. Thus, Justice
Marshall's intuition to ignore the admonishment to focus on the formality
of the administrative procedures is important. By defining review according
to the type of issue in question, he incorporated the advantages of an issuesensitive form of review.
IV. REVIEW OF FACT-FINDING
Justice Scalia's view that the controverted issues were factual, not so much
his weak effort to apply the process-driven word formula system, formed
the center of the controversy in Curtin Matheson. The contrast between his
efforts to review fact-finding in contrast to Justice Marshall's efforts to review
policy demonstrates the versatility of the issue-driven strategy.
Traditionally, fact-finding demands its own review strategy. 74 As with
policymaking, questions of fact are and should be dominated by the agency

72. I KocH, supra note 2, at § 3.52.
73. See generally McGarity, supra note 2.
74. The plurality Supreme Court opinion in Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 106 S. Ct. 2101,
2111-12 (1986), demonstrates that when necessary the courts rely on this difference. In Bowen,
the court conceded to the agency substantial authority in "governing" but raised the level of
review of the factual conclusions that support the exercise of that power. "Our recognition of
Congress' need to vest administrative agencies with ample power to assist in the difficult task of
governing a vast and complex industrial Nation carries with it the correlative responsibility of
the agency to explain the rationale and factual basis for its decision, even though we show respect
for the agency's judgment in both." /d. at 2112.
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decision makers. 75 Nonetheless, as evidenced by the conflicting opinions in
Curtin Matheson, the review strategies as to these two categories of agency
dominated issues will differ in kind and degree.
The act of fact-finding differs fundamentally from determinations of
policy. Jaffe provided a useful working definition: "A finding of fact is the
assertion that a phenomenon has happened or is or will be happening independent of or anterior to any assertion as to its legal effect. " 76 Thus, for
our purposes, a "fact" is something done or having existence or information with objective reality. 77 Fact-finding, while different from policymaking, is no less important. Justice Scalia concluded his dissent with "Chief
justice Hughes' description of the unscrupulous administrator's prayer: 'Let
me find the facts for the people of my country, and I care little who lays
down the general principles.' " 78
Justice Scalia's review strategy focused on the factual nature of the Board's
decision. Nonetheless, he too recognized that the agency's authority, and
hence the limits on judicial authority, over fact-finding is quite different
from its authority over policymaking. Here he found that the NLRB's
conclusions were "bad fact-finding, and must be reversed under the
'substantial evidence' test. " 79 Here also he recognized that the limitations
on review of the two differ in kind as well as degree. 80 Justice Scalia
contended that the NLRB circumvented scrutiny of its policymaking by
appearing to apply factual presumptions just as the majority had conducted
inappropriate review by reviewing those presumptions as policy. 81 In the
75. Intermittently, the idea appears that certain types of facts, sometimes known as 'jurisdictional facts" or "constitutional facts," should be dominated by the courts, i.e., administrative findings of such facts should be subject to de novo review. 2 KOCH, supra note 2, at 125-28. Support
for the concept of constitutional facts can be found in Strong, The Persistent Doctrine of "Constitutional Fact," 46 N.C.L. REV. 223 (1968).
76. L.jAFFE,jUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 548 (1965) (emphasis omitted);
accord B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 650 (2d ed. 1984) ("Analytically, a question offact
is only a question of whether something has happened independent of any assertion as to its legal
effect.").
77. One trial judge found E.B. White's definition of "fact" meaningful:" 'Use this word only
of matters capable of verification, not matters of judgment.' " L. FORER, A CHILLING EFFECT:
THE MOUNTING THREAT OF LIBEL AND INVASION OF PRIVACY ACTIONS TO THE fiRST
AMENDMENT 267 (1987).
78. NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., I I 0 S. Ct. I 542, I 566 (I 990) (Scalia,J., dissenting).
79. /d. at I 564 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
80. While the word formula system works better in defining review of fact-finding, Curtin
Matheson demonstrates its weakness as a complete review strategy.
81. This comment is based on a valuable observation about the relationship among presumptions, inferences, fact-finding and policymaking. Scalia observed that presumptions operate quite
differently from inferences and that the majority's mistake resulted from the failure to recognize
this difference. The agency may create presumptions "in the teeth of the facts, as means of implementing authorized law or policy in the course of adjudication." I 10 S. Ct. at 1564 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis in original). Inferences (or presumptions of fact) are not created by the
agency but control the agency "representing the dictates of reason and logic that must be applied
in making adjudicatory factual determinations." /d. Scalia concluded:
[T]he Board may choose to implement authorized law or policy in adjudication by forbidding a rational inference, just as it may do so by requiring a non rational one (which is what
a presumption of law is) .... But that is not what the agency did here. It relied on the
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end justice Scalia commented: "[The NLRB] is not entitled to disguise policymaking as fact-finding, and thereby to escape the legal and political limitations to which policymaking is subject. " 82 That statement seems to admit
that his review of policymaking would have been different even in the
context of adjudication.
The bundle of issues resulting in a given administrative decision may
contain different types of factual issues. For generations, administrative law
has used the distinction between specific facts ("adjudicative" facts) or
general facts ("legislative" facts), 83 and that distinction should guide review.
Review strategy that distinguishes facts is superior to one that reviews facts
differently depending on the procedures used to develop them. Although
some courts, including the majority in Curtin Matheson, instinctively vary
their review for certain types of facts, the practice needs to become a formal
aspect of our general review strategy.
Specific facts are by nature central to determinations of individual rights
and duties, and hence they have a unique importance to a system that prizes
individualization. 84 They also differ from general facts in that specific facts
can be "proven" in the traditional ways and do not raise the same kinds of
evaluation problems as do general facts. For these reasons, courts might
review these facts very closely.
reasoning of [a prior case], which rested upon the conclusion that, as a matter of logic and
reasoning, ''the hiring of permanent replacements who cross a picket line, in itself, does
not support an inference that the replacements repudiate the union as collective-bargaining representative." That is simply false. It is bad factfinding, and must be reversed under
the "substantial evidence" test.
/d. (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
The agency could make policy that ignored or repudiated relevant facts but it cannot
purport to find facts that a court cannot accept as reasonable. Justice Scalia's problem with
the Board's conduct was not that it may not adopt "counterfactual policy determination"
but that it may not do so "as ordinary factfinding." /d. at I 565 (Scalia,J ., dissenting). When
the agency is making policy, it must say so and do so through policymaking processes. Here
he found that the Board undertook fact-finding and did not do so adequately.
82. /d. at I 566 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
83. Although for the purposes of this analysis the terms "specific" and "general" facts
seem sufficient, the terms "adjudicative" and "legislative" facts may have a richer meaning:
The key difference between adjudicative and legislative facts is not the characteristics
of particular versus general facts, but rather, evidence whose proof has a more established
place and more predictable effect within a framework of established legal rules as distinct
from evidence that is more manifestly designed to create the rules. The line between adjudicative and legislative facts is indistinct, however, because decision makers use even the
most particularized facts to make legal rules.
Wool handler, Rethinking the judicial Reception of Legislative Facts, 4 I V AND. L. REV. Ill, 114
(1988); see also 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 15.03 (1958); Davis, An
Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 404-07
(1942). The idea has been applied outside administrative law, particularly in evidence. E.g.,
Advisory Committee's Notes, FED. R. EVID. 20 I.
In the context of a review strategy, the distinction between general and specific seems
sufficient.
84. "When a court or an agency finds facts concerning the immediate parties-who did
what, where, when, how, and with what motive or intent-the court or agency is performing
an adjudicative function, and the facts are conveniently called adjudicative facts." 2 K. DAVIS,
supra note 83, at 353.
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The present word formula system decides the degree of judicial scrutiny
of specific facts based on the formality of the procedures. If the fact is found
through formal adjudication then review is substantial evidence (reasonableness); if the fact is found through informal processes then review is arbitrariness. ~ 5 In terms of the comparative basis that gives these word formulas
meaning, the court is instructed to give less scrutiny to specific facts found
on an informal record and more scrutiny to those found on a formal record.
In short, the present system requires less review for cases involving less
procedure. 86 Again, the level of review should depend on the comparative
advantages of courts and agencies over the types of issues rather than the
nature of the processY
Review of specific facts involves the tension between the importance of
individual rights and the needs of society. Resolution of such factual issues
seem to score high on all three of the Mathews v. Eldridge factors. 88 Specific
facts are extremely important to the individual and additional consideration
may substantially contribute to accuracy, but the facts are so numerous that
cost-effective resolution is important to the operation of many government
programs. How should these tensions be played out in designing a review
system? Since judicial review is undeniably costly, the answer must depend
on the judicial capacity to improve the ultimate decision. Several factors
weigh on this decision.
Process advantages argue for administrative dominance over questions of
specific fact. The administrative process can be designed to take advantage
of the most cost-effective approach to specific facts. Also, the nature of
specific fact-finding necessarily limits review; specific facts often involve
decisions as to testamentary competence and reliability. Usually such issues
are controlled by the on-site decisionmaker and effective review would create
redundancies. For these reasons, the decision might be left to the administrative level fact finder.
Other factors, however, countervail arguments for limited review of
specific facts. Since the final decision in the administrative process itself is
usually made by an appellate administrative authority that has not actually
heard the evidence, the appellate judicial authority might· have equal

85. Rulemaking rarely, if ever, depends on finding of specific facts.
86. While it seems irrational to define the review function for specific facts inversely to
the formality of the process, it may make some sense from a decisionmaking resource allocation point-of-view. The argument for this result is that extensive judicial review of facts
found on an informal record would rejudicialize decisionmaking that had been assigned
intentionally to nonjudicialized decisionmaking. United States v. Erika, Inc., 456 U.S. 201,
209-10 ( 1982). Control of the potential costs of comprehensive judicial review of findings
of specific facts might be more effectively incorporated into the review system through less
structured and more sensitive law.
87. Levin, supra note 63, at 272 ("[T]here is no logical reason for courts to give a particular fact finding less critical scrutiny when it underlies a regulation than they would have
given it if it had underlain an adjudicative order.").
88. 424 u.s. 319, 335 (1976).
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competence. 89 Also, limited judicial scrutiny of specific facts rarely can be
justified by a strong claim of administrative expertise. 9° Findings of specific
facts rarely depend on technical expertise and the most an agency can claim
is substantial experience dealing with certain specific facts. Moreover, judges
are accustomed to reviewing specific facts because they do so in reviewing
inferior courts. Judges then have the capacity to make a nearly equal contribution to the resolution of specific factual questions.
Nonetheless, administrative tribunals make millions of findings of specific
fact every day. In economics jargon, the degree of agency dominance over
specific facts should be measured by the bureaucracy's "comparative advantage. " 91 If courts were to review these findings with any depth, they would
be paralyzed and unable to perform more important functions. The key is
how much responsibility over specific facts can we afford to assign to the
courts. Here the opportunity costs are immense. It seems likely that judicial
review of agency determinations of specific fact will not increase accuracy
equal to the increase in decisionmaking costs. 92 If we mire the courts in the
mass of specific factual decisions, even controversial ones, made by the
bureaucracy, we will prevent the courts from performing much more
important functions to which they can make a greater contribution. 93
Thus, the courts may have the capacity to review findings of specific fact
very closely but should not. The reasonable trade-offs offered by Mathews
would suggest that the cost of extensive review to society usually would be
far greater than the benefits to the individual. This argues for the courts
generally accepting the agency's finding and for review law that instructs
89. In fact, current review doctrine incorporates this idea by increasing the judicial scrutiny of certain types of agency decisions when the administrative appellate authority disagrees
with the presiding official. I KocH SUPP., supra note 2, at § 6.54A.
90. For example, Social Security Administration disability cases use medical and vocational expert evidence, as in a judicial proceeding, but the decisions are made by lawyers
(administrative law judges) after the initial stage. F. BLOCH, FEDERAL DISABILITY LAW AND
PRACTICE § 4.20 ( 1984).
91. "Comparative advantage" is an economics term that seems to soften the controversy
here. In economics, it is a way of conceptualizing the efficient allocation of functions among
various productive units. If Y is better than X at everything, it is still better that X perform
some functions, the functions for which Y's effort is of less value. As to these functions, X
has a comparative advantage even if not an absolute advantage. Here it allows us to avoid
an argument over the relative competence of the two institutions and still argue for allocating
dominance between them. Comparative advantage might suggest that, for example, even
though the courts are always better decisionmakers, we optimize decisionmaking resources
if we assign some decision-making tasks to the bureaucracy. A general description of comparative advantage can be found in most basic economics texts. See, e.g., A. ALCHIAN & W.
ALLEN, EXCHANGE & PRODUCTION: COMPETITION, COORDINATION, & CONTROL 141-43 (3d
ed. 1983).
92. j. MASHAW, C. GOETT, F. GOODMAN, W. SCHWARTZ, P. VERKUIL & M. CARROW,
SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS (A Study for the National Center for Administrative Justice), 146-47 (1978) ("The contribution of court-review to accuracy through its
corrective function is modest at best.").
93. Indeed the burden on the courts may be affecting their ability to contribute. Strauss,
One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for
Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. I 093, 1100-08 (1987).
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courts to tolerate a reasonably high risk of error. Courts should intervene
only at the extreme.
Nonetheless, there may be circumstances that support exceptions to this
general principle. The system, and a reviewing court, should base its acceptance of administrative decisions in a specific program on some judgment
as to the value of the judicial contribution. The depth of the judicial scrutiny should depend on a judgment as to the general risk of error created
by acceptance of the agency dominance in the particular decisionmaking
context. The review system then should develop a consistent judicial strategy as to these special circumstances. An issue-driven strategy would allow
the trade-offs to be faced up front and not hidden by formalism.
Many administrative decisions depend on conclusions of general or legislative facts. 94 The questions raised in developing a review strategy for these
facts are quite different from those raised by review of specific facts. Courts
do tend to conduct more limited review of general facts. 95
In support of the Board's policy conclusions in Curtin Matheson, Justice
Marshall agreed with its approach "as an empirical matter. " 96 He kept review
of this empirical support, that is, the Board's findings of general facts, very
limited. Justice Marshall concluded that factual conclusions contrary to the
Board's were not inevitable. 97 Similarly, Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his
concurring opinion, found that the Board's conclusions "press to the limit
the deference to which the Board is entitled in assessing industrial reality. " 98 Justice Blackmun in dissent also accepted the Board's power over the
general facts at issue. He suggested that he would strike down only "an
implausible assessment of industrial reality." 99 On the factual issues, he was
concerned that there appeared to be a total "lack of empirical support." 100
Even Justice Scalia, who attempted to apply the substantial evidence test to
the facts, seemed to adopt subconsciously a very restrained level of review.
He concluded that "it seems to me impossible to conclude on this record"
that the Board's fact-finding is reasonable. 101
Judicial restraint in the face of findings of general fact results from several
factors. The agencies generally have or develop expertise as to all general
facts that are relevant to their functions. Often this expertise is more expe94. "When a court or an agency develops law or policy, it is acting legislatively ... the
facts which inform the tribunal's legislative judgment are called legislative facts." 2 K. DAVIS,
supra note 83, at 353.
95. E.g., Bradford Nat'l Clearing Corp. v. SEC, 590 F.2d 1085, 1103-04 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(even where substantial evidence review is authorized, courts should limit their review of
general facts); Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62, 83-85 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(reviewing courts should give less scrutiny to agency inference from available data and existing knowledge).
96. NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 1542, 1550 (1990).
97. I d. at 1552-53.
98. /d. at 1554 (Rehnquist, C.J ., concurring).
99. /d. at 1556 (Blackmun, J ., dissenting).
100. Jd.
I 0 I. /d. at 1557 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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rience than actual knowledge. But the agency nonetheless has had broader
experience with a wide range of general facts and is often capable of making
a more sophisticated decision as to general facts.
The dominance of the agency may also depend on its efficacy for evaluating the correctness of findings of general facts. Finding general facts
usually incorporates a point of view. A well-schooled point of view is superior and hence the agency has an advantage. It is simply not easy to say that
a conclusion of general fact has been demonstrated and that correctness
depends on who decides the question. Judges often seize on the most obvious answer, but a sophisticated decisionmaker sees the full complexity of
the question. If the court abuses its position, it adds inaccuracy. A reviewing
court then must be tolerant of the administrative conclusion if the program
is to have the sophistication envisioned by the delegation to the agency in
the first place.
The agencies also have a process advantage. Rulemaking allows the agency
to develop records specifically designed for finding such facts. 102 Rulemaking also allows experts actually to participate in the decisionmaking itself.
Even in adjudication the agencies have processes better designed for finding general facts and for incorporating expert judgments.
On close consideration, however, these advantages are not overpowering.
The agency expertise advantages as to many general facts are important
but do not suggest that the courts cannot make a substantive contribution.
In many situations, the court can use the agency expertise in its own decisionmaking and hence determine how it can best contribute. Because the
actual administrative decisionmaking usually is left to a generalist bureaucrat, indistinguishable in training from a judge, the expertise argument is
weakened further.
Similarly, the process advantage in fact-gathering does not necessarily
translate into an advantage in the fact-finding. The court can review general
facts on the record developed by the agency. 103 The courts, therefore, are
very much disadvantaged in directing the search for data, but less disadvantaged in drawing conclusions from the 'data. These considerations
diminish the administrative advantage.
In addition, the breadth of the impact of many findings of general facts
increases the overall value of the judicial contribution. Although adjustments in specific facts might have substantial impact on one individual, even
a small improvement in a general fact-finding may affect an array of individuals. Close judicial scrutiny of general facts offers a substantial net benefit to society if that scrutiny can be expected to bring about even an
102.

ArrORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT

14 (1947)

("Typically, the issues [in rulemakingj relate not to the evidentiary facts ... but rather to
the policy-making conclusions to be drawn from the facts.").
I 03. Courts now review rulemaking records compiled by the agency even though they
cannot themselves develop such records. The character of the record presents no great obstacle to an expanded judicial role with respect to general facts.
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incremental improvement in accuracy. The decisionmaking resource argument for limited review is not as strong as in review of specific facts. Thus
for many general facts the courts can have a relatively significant role perhaps
almost equal to that of the agency.
This all pushes in a revolutionary direction. It may be that the law should
develop in the direction of more judicial scrutiny of many decisions of
general facts. 104 Indeed, courts often feel compelled to engage in close scrutiny of general facts. 105 These courts are called activist but they may not be
following that judicial philosophy at all. The real problem is that the law
does not permit them to do what they know needs to be done.
The nature of this review must reflect the comparative advantages of the
two institutions. The agencies are superior fact gatherers and hence the
courts should do little monitoring of fact-gathering. Yet review cannot allow
the agencies unlimited authority in determining what facts to gather. The
"hard look" approach works well here. 106 In evaluating the accumulation
of the relevant facts, it should be enough for the courts to determine that
the agency did a careful job of fact-gathering. 107 The heightened review
will increase only the evaluation of the conclusions drawn from the data
compiled. 108
I 04. The word formula system has artificially constrained this development because it has
based heightened review on the formality of the record, and it has tended to require little
scrutiny of general facts because they are usually made in informal rulemaking.
105. E.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
106. Simply, using hard look review, the courts look closely at whether the agency has
taken a hard look at the question (i.e., the court is not to take a hard look itself). Hard Look
retains the focus on the administrative decision while intensifying judicial scrutiny, especially
where the agency action is questionable. Nonetheless judicial inquiry carefully examines the
decisionmaking elements in a way that does not interfere with the administrative decisionmaking itself. The "hard look" doctrine was hinted at by Judge Leventhal in Greater Boston
Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850-51 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923
(1971) and formed later in an article, Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role
of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 514 (1974). Slowly it has evolved into a staple element
of modern judicial review theory. See Shapiro & Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch:
Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987 DUKE
L.J. 387, 419-21 (arguing that strict reasons requirement results from the recent increase
in substantive review).
I 07. Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard- Look Doctrine, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 177, 183 ("The
substantive component of the hard-look doctrine is a judicial willingness to overturn decisions
that appear unjustified in light of the evidentiary record. This aspect of the doctrine has
been rarely exercised.") (footnotes omitted).
I 08. However, some legislative facts are very judgmental and require the reviewing court
to be particularly sensitive to the intended allocation of decisionmaking authority. For example, Fox contrasted the voting of two recent FTC chairmen on the decision to take action
against the General Motors-Toyota joint venture:
[Ojne who believes that the forces of competition are robust would not see any costs to
the American consumer. On the other hand, ... one who is sympathetic to the view that
the market is susceptible to collusion and that independent action of major market factors
tend to yield more progressiveness than combinations, and one who predicts that government trade restraints will persist or recur, is likely to foresee that the social costs of the
joint venture will overwhelm its possible benefits .
. . . World views about big business and its power, about consumers and their sovereignty,
and about the power of business and the power of government, and which is the more to
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Some general facts, however, are clearly more a function of expertise
than others. Thus, at least with respect to a review strategy, we might spin
out from the traditional notion of legislative facts a separate category: technical facts. 109 Conclusions as to these facts involve special training and
expertise. It is readily recognized that many conclusions reached by the
agency are the result of a technical competence that even the most arrogant
nonexpert could not hope to replicate. 110
Generalist courts should not involve themselves in these decisions. 111 The
argument for protecting this group of general facts, however, has spilled
over into other general facts for which the courts could, as discussed above,
make a useful contribution. 112 Therefore, one reason for trying to separate
this group from most general facts is to allow the law to develop in the
direction of increased review for many other general facts.
As to technical facts, however, courts should continue to proceed with
great care. A court really cannot make up for its deficiencies here; competency is not merely in testing the validity of the factual record and evaluating the agency's jump from that record to its technical conclusion. True,
experts disagree but, assuming they are making expert judgments, they
disagree at a level of sophistication that is beyond the nonexpert. 113 Courts
lack the learning to move from the facts to a defensible conclusion. Although
federal judges are at least as inclined as other lawyers to believe they can
learn anything in a short period, they are constrained by the absence of a
long-term familiarity with an alien discipline. Indeed, there is substantial
likelihood that they will decrease the validity of these decisions rather than
increase them. 114
be feared, determined the positions adopted by the [two commissioners f.
Fox, Chairman Miller, the Federal Trade Commission, Economics, and RASHOMON, 50 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 54 (1987). See Bazelon, The Impact of the Courts on Public Administration,
52 IND. L.J. 101, 108 (1976) (Even if society "knows" the risk of a certain action, somehow
it must decide whether the action will create a net benefit.).
109. See generally W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE, P. STRAUSS, T. RAKOFF, R. SCHOTLAND,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS ch. VII,§ 4 (8th ed. 1987).
110. E.g., Tri-Bio Laboratories, Inc. v. United States, 836 F.2d 135, 142 (3d Cir. 1987);
Thompson Medical Co., Inc. v. FTC, 791 F.2d 189, 196 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
Ill. E.g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555,569 (1980) ("Administrative
agencies are simply better suited than courts to engage in such [an expert] process."); Federal
Power Comm'n v. Florida Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453, 463 (1972) ("[WJe recognize
the relevant agency's technical expertise and experience, and defer to its analysis unless it is
without substantial basis in fact.").
112. McGarity, supra note 2, at 797-808 (While review of technical facts should be limited,
"trans-scientific" facts, those on which experts cannot reach a definitive answer, should be
more carefully reviewed).
113. E.g., S. RHOADS, THE ECONOMIST'S VIEW OF THE WORLD: GOVERNMENT, MARKETS,
AND PUBLIC POLICY 4-5 (1985).
114. R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO, & P. VERKUIL, supra note 34, observed:
Professor McGarity argues that scientific questions that appear to raise issues of fact
actually raise issues that fall somewhere on a spectrum between issues of pure scientific
fact, in the sense that the question can be answered relatively easily through application
of existing scientific methodology, to issues of pure policy, in the sense that the question
cannot be answered at all thJr]ough use of existing scientific methodology. Most issues lie
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Therefore, the courts should accept agency findings of technical fact
except in those cases where the risk of error is substantially demonstrated.
Though they sometimes stray, most judges understand and accept their
deficiencies as to truly technical facts. If this is confined to true technical
facts, the restraint is necessary to deriving the full benefit from the administrative process. 115
The restraint need apply only as to true technical findings. Justice Frankfurter's authoritative opinion in Chenery Jl 16 limits this restraint to those
issues over which the agency has actually exercised its technical expertise.
A court need not show any special respect for a technical decision by a
generalist official with no special claim to technical competence. In addition, review of policy judgments derived from such findings, while also
limited, are limited in a different way and degree. 117 Indeed, the identification of technical issues might depend on whether the decision itself required
technical competence.
V. REVIEW OF LAW IN CONTRAST TO REVIEW OF POLICY
The restraints on review of policymaking and fact-finding should not
diminish the judicial authority over questions of law. This principle is well
established in general legal theory as well as in administrative law. Since
Marbury v. Madison, the courts have dominated questions of law. 118 Administrative law has long recognized judicial dominance over questions of law
as agencies have administrative dominance over questions of policy. 119 State,
between these poles.
/d. at 364 (footnote omitted).

115. This seems preferable to educating the judges. But see Wald, Making "Informed" Decisions on the District ofColumbia Circuit, 50 Gw. WASH. L. REV. 135 (1982).
116. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80,92 (1943).
117. McGarity, supra note 2, at 809. In an article distinguishing hard scientific fact from
"science policy," McGarity concludes: "[!]fa court recognizes that the resolution of science
policy questions depends on striking a balance between accuracy and result-oriented policies,
it can play a valuable substantive review role." /d.
118. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 ( 1803) ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."). The FAPA attempts to
incorporate this long-standing concept. Massachusetts v. Secretary of Health and Human
Servs., 816 F.2d 796, 801 (1st Cir. 1987). Subsection (A) permits the court to strike down
conclusions that are "otherwise not in accordance with law" and subsection (C) prevents
decisions that are "in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of
statutory right." 5 U .S.C. § 706 (1988). These phrases are clumsy and largely meaningless
in application. Nonetheless the drafters' intention was clear: "This subsection provides that
questions of law are for courts rather than agencies to decide in the last analysis .... " (S.
REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 214 (1946); accord H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1946), reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE Acr LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 278 (1946).
119. Richard Fallon found that there are two lines of cases on the standard of review of
questions of law. One line holds that a court can only review the agency's determination of
law for reasonableness and the other recognizes judicial dominance. Fallon pointed out that
the second approach is still sensitive to all the values inherent in deference:
A requirement that courts determine questions of law independently is not completely
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as well as federal, administrative law accepts this principle. 120
Nothing should diminish the "well-established principle of administrative
law" that in reviewing the bundle of issues that comprise an administrative
decision the agency's determination is dominant as to policy but not as to
law. 121 The best example of this long-standing principle as it applies to the
incompatible with the "deference" that existing practice accords and that the modern
administrative state arguably requires. At least two kinds of deference are consistent with
the proposition that the power to engage in independent review must be vested in an article
III court: deference to an agency's congressionally delegated lawmaking power and deference to an agency's interpretive expertise .... [A]n article III court frequently should
conclude that Congress committed the power to resolve a particular legal question to the
agency rather than to the courts ....
When a court renders its ruling after an administrative agency has spoken, the agency's
decision is a part of the legal landscape that the court appropriately takes into account.
Even though a court must have ultimate responsibility for the correct decision of questions
of law, no article III value forbids acknowledgement that, concerning questions to which
administrative expertise is relevant, the agency's interpretation furnishes a presumptively
reliable indicator of how the question ought to be resolved. In deferring in this way, a
court does not absolve itself of responsibility for determining that issues of law are decided
"correctly," not merely "reasonably." Nevertheless, its inquiry frequently addresses the
reasonableness of the agency's decision. In areas of the agency's expertise, the evident
reasonableness of its conclusion may provide a crucial basis for the court's decision.
Fallon, supra note 2, at 983-85 (footnotes omitted).
Actually, a sharp distinction between the two lines of cases seems unjustified; rather, some
courts have overstated the controlling effect of administrative decisions on questions of law.
Stephen Breyer, First Circuit judge, offered these observations as to how judges actually
weigh agency interpretations of law:
Inevitably, one suspects, we will find the courts actually following more varied approaches,
sometimes deferring to agency interpretations, sometimes not, depending upon the statute, the question, the context, and what "makes sense" in the particular litigation, in light
of the basic statute and its purposes. No particular, or single simple judicial formula can
capture or take into account the varying responses, called for by different circumstances,
and the need to promote a "proper," harmonious, effective or workable agency-court
relationship.
Breyer, supra note 2, at 38l.
Judge Breyer suggests that the law is not so clear but he leaves no doubt as to what he
thinks the law should be: "Would one not expect courts to conduct a stricter review of matters
of law, where courts are more expert, but more lenient review of matters of policy, where
agencies are more expert?" /d. at 397.
120. E.g., Connecticut State Medical Soc'y v. Connecticut Bd. of Examiners in Podiatry,
546 A.2d 830, 834 (Conn. 1988).
12l. Much less confusion results from the distinction between law and facts. While there
is sometimes confusion at the margin, courts generally seem capable of distinguishing questions of law from questions of fact and reviewing the two differently. A classic example is
the Hearst opinion. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. Ill (1944). The issue was
whether newsboys were "employees" under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 152. The majority found that the question was not one of law for the Court to decide:
"[W]here the question is one of specific application of a broad statutory term in a proceeding
in which the agency administering the statute must determine it initially, the reviewing court's
function is limited." /d. at 13l. The dissent, however, found the same question to be one of
law: "The question who is an employee, so as to make the statute applicable to him, is a
question of the meaning of the Act and, therefore, is a judicial and not an administrative
question." /d. at 136 (Roberts, J ., dissenting). The conflicting conclusions on this issue resulted
in the disagreement as to the final outcome of the review.
An interesting state example is Connecticut State Medical Soc'y v. Connecticut Bd. of
Examiners in Podiatry, 546 A.2d 830 (Conn. 1988), in which the Connecticut Supreme Court
concluded that the question as to whether the ankle was part of the foot was a question of
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relationship between the agency policymaking functions and the development of law is the first Chenery case. 122 The SEC prohibited insider trading,
not under its power to define prohibited practices, but as an interpretation
of the law. Because it was interpreting law rather than carrying out its policymaking function, the Supreme Court said the SEC's opinion about the
law was entitled to little extra weight. The Supreme Court noted, however,
that if the SEC had made its own decision as an exercise of its authorized
policymaking function, then the Court could not interfere unless that exercise was arbitrary. 123
More recent authority for the distinction between review of policy and
review of law is Federal Communications Commission v. WNCN Listeners
Guild.l 24 The FCC attempted to deregulate programming by a statement
generally abandoning its "diversity" requirements. The lower court found
that the decision as to whether the statute required deregulation was a question of law "in which the judicial word is final." 125 The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the decision to permit the market to decide program
format was a question of policy rather than law.l 26 The Court held that the
judicial function was extremely limited because the question was left to the
"broad discretion" of the FCC in policymaking. 127
Nonetheless, the "Chevron doctrine" 128 has caused some confusion that
the issue-driven strategy must confront. This doctrine derives not so much
from the Supreme Court opinion as from the interpretations of that opinion. The opinion has been read to severely limit judicial review of law and
debate rages as to how much the opinion limits review.l 29 About these interlaw and not fact. Although surprising, it is difficult to disagree in the context of this case.
Regardless, the outcome depended on the characterization of the issue.
One unfortunate idea has been that of a mixed question of law and fact. Schwartz describes
a conflict between the Friendly view and the Frankfurter-Harlan view. B. SCHWARTZ, supra
note 76, at 650-54. The Friendly approach would change an agency finding applying law to
facts into a mixed question of fact with limited review. The Frankfurter-Harlan approach
would separate the legal aspects from the factual aspects. Schwartz agreed with the latter:
"The judicial label cannot change the presence of both legal and factual elements in findings
involving application of legal concepts to the facts of a case." /d. at 652. The Friendly approach
is anathematic to the issue-driven review strategy.
122. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
123. /d. at 94; see also SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194,207 (1947); Packard Motor
Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 498 (1947) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Phelps Dodge Corp. v.
NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 197 (1941).
124. 450 u.s. 582 (1981).
125. WNCN Listeners Guild v. FCC, 610 F.2d 838,855 (D.C. Cir. 1979), rev'd, 450 U.S.
582 (1981).
126. 450 U.S. at 592-99, 604.
127. /d. at 594.
128. Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
129. Pierce, Chevron and Its Aftermath: judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory
Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301,302 (1988) ("In the three years since the Court decided
Chevron, the case has transformed dramatically the approach taken by courts in reviewing
agency interpretations of statutory provisions."). But see Note, A Framework for judicial Review
of an Agency's Statutory Interpretation: Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 1985 DUKE L.J. 469, 4 70 ("The note concludes that Chevron, in establishing a frame-
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pretations, one might echo Justice Scalia's statement which introduced this
article: These interpretations make "heavy weather out of what is, under
well-established principles of administrative law, a straightforward case." 130
Unfortunately, the Chevron opinion used some very loose language in
distinguishing review of policy from review of law and this loose language
has been seized upon by some to find a new restraint on the traditional
judicial dominance over questions of law.
The "Chevron doctrine" casts an unnecessary shadow in this previously
well-lit corner of judicial review law. The Chevron opinion, read in the
context of the long-standing distinction between review of law and policy,
does not itself create this confusion. The case involved an EPA regulation
allowing states to lump pollution sources by "bubbles" of related sources
so that a decision to permit construction would be based on compliance by
the "bubble" rather than the individual source. 131 The Court found that
this was a permissible construction by the EPA of the Clean Air Act. 132
Read with reference to "well-established principles of administrative law,"
the opinion merely reaffirms the traditional agency dominance over policymaking. The Court could not have made its intentions clearer:
"The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created
... program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of
rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress." Morton v. Ruiz,
415 U.S. 199, 231 ( 197 4). If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to
fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific
provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are given
controlling weight unless they are arbitrary .... 133

The Court did not intend to make new law about review ofpolicymaking.' 34
The opinion quoted a 1961 opinion stating that a court should not disturb
an agency's accommodation of "conflicting policies." 135 It upheld the EPA
rule because the rule was "a reasonable policy choice for the agency to
make." 136 The Court made the true nature of its holding even clearer in
its summation: "When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory
work of analysis for review of an agency interpretation of the statute in its charge, is a significant decision providing long-awaited guidance to the lower federal courts."). Some have
given the opinion a "strong" reading which severely limits review of "law" and some a "weak"
reading. Pierce, supra. The strong reading has been criticized. Sunstein, judicial Rroiew of
Administrative Action in a Conservative Era, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 353, 366-71 (1987).
·
130. NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 1542, 1557 (1990) (Scalia,J.,
dissenting).
131. 467 U.S. at 840.
132. /d. at 866; 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(a)(3), 7502(b)(6), 7602(j).
133. 467 U.S. at 843-44.
134. Justice Stevens also followed another "well-established principle of administrative
law": the binding effect of legislative rules. "Such legislative regulations are given controlling
weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." Id. at 844.
135. /d. at 845 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382-83 (1961)).
136. /d. (emphasis added). The court went on to justify this conclusion for the traditional
reasons of expertise. /d. at 845-4 7.
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provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency's policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left
open by Congress, the challenge must fail." 137 Thus the case merely followed
the long line of cases in which policymaking receives very limited review. 138
Unfortunately, some read Chevron's recognition of policymaking dominance as a new limit on the judicial authority over questions of law. The
Court did caution reviewing judges that where they find "the intent of
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter." 139 The Court stated the
obvious proposition that a court must obey the law itself: "If a court,
employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that
Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention
is the law and must be given effect." 140 Hence, courts may be dominant
over questions of law but they are not free agents. 141 This is not
extraordinary. 142
What is extraordinary, if true, is the limits some find in the opinion on
the traditional judicial dominance over questions of law. However, one need
only separate those portions of the opinion dealing with the agencies' traditional dominance over policymaking from those portions dealing with the
courts' traditional dominance over questions of law to fit Chevron into a
long line of similar cases.
Necessarily there is a close relationship between questions of law and
questions of policy. Indeed, law is policy that has been adopted by legislative
action or the common law process. The two are related closely at least for
the purposes of administrative law; however, they are widely different in
allocation of decisionmaking authority between the judiciary and the
bureaucracy. The failure to distinguish accurately between the two may
lead to immense mistakes in defining review, as evidenced by the progeny
of the Chevron decision.
137. /d. at 866.
138. Jordan, Deference Revisited: Politics as a Determinant of Deference Doctrine and the End
of the Apparent Chevron Consensus, 68 NEB. L. REV. 454, 458-65 (1989); Koch,Judicial Review
of Administrative Discretion, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 469, 490-91 (1986); Note, The Chevron
Legacy: Young v. Community Nutrition Institute Compounds the Confusion, 73 CORNELL L.
REV. 113, 115-18 (1987).
139. 467 U.S. at 842.
140. /d. at 843 n.9.
141. In such cases, the controversy does not represent a tension between administrative
versus judicial decisionmaking but between judicial decisionmaking versus the legislative
branch. See Komesar, A Job for the Judges: The judiciary and the Constitution in a Massive and
Complex Society, 86 MICH. L. REv. 657, 665 (I 988) ("The central theme of this article is that
this role [of judicial review] can only be defined by considering the relative ability of the
courts and the political process to resolve societal issues, a difficult task."). In a sense the
court usurps not just the agency's authority but the legislative authority by straying into the
realm ofpolicymaking left to the agency. Levin, supra note 2, at 21-22.
142. Fallon, supra note 2, at 985 ("Even though a court must have ultimate responsibility
for the correct decision of questions of law, no article III value forbids acknowledgement
that, concerning questions to which administrative expertise is relevant, the agency's interpretation furnishes a presumptively reliable indicator of how the question ought to be
resolved.").
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Whatever the difficulties in developing an abstract definition of "law," 143
a working definition for these purposes is relatively straightforward. In this
context, the term "law" refers to decisions advancing or protecting collective goals established through either the legislative process or the "common
law" process. The necessary contrast here is between this law and what
might be called "agency law." Where the agency is given the authority to
decide questions of collective or societal interest, it may create "agency law."
I choose to refer to this "law" as policy to emphasize the contrast between
such decisions made by the agency and similar decisions made through the
law-making processes of the legislature or the common law. Where the
source of the decision on collective or societal interest is not the agency,
then we have a question of "law" (sufficient for our purposes) and the courts
are dominant. 144 Where the source is the agency, we have a question of
"policy" and the agency is dominant.
A similar approach was taken by Levin in his comprehensive discussion
of review of law. 145 Basically he defined law as "normative" decisions over
which the court has "independent" authority. 146 These normative decisions
are taken from the sources of law, particularly Congress. If these sources
do not make the normative decisions, or leave to the agency the authority
to make those decisions, then the agency must exercise discretion and its
decision is dominant. The term "normative" does not quite capture the
shared element. For me, however, and hence I describe it instead as the
advancement of protection of collective or societal goals.
Regardless, the review strategy must focus on the proper allocation of
authority over decisions with this shared element. The process of policymaking, whether by the legislative process, the common law process or the
administrative process, is a complex melding of general fact-finding, various
types of expertise, and special judgment. Therefore, it seems more accurate
to distinguish the term "law," as used to find the appropriate judicial review
function, as decisions about collective goals made through either the legislative or common law processes, from decisions about collective goals made
through the administrative process, that is, policymaking. 147
143. See generally R. DwORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE ch. I (1986) (saying that lawyers and judges
seem to spend a good deal of time and effort doing law even though legal theorists have not
discovered a universal definition of "law").
144. LjAFFE, supra note 76, at 546-48; B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 76, at 650-53.
145. Levin, supra note 2. Levin distinguishes law and "discretion" by which he means what
I have designated policymaking discretion. /d. at 12-13.
146. /d. at 12.
147. Without using the same terminology, others have found a distinction between "law"
over which the courts have dominant authority and "agency law,"·i.e., policymaking. Breyer,
supra note 2, at 364. Landis suggested that administrative "law" is law that the lawmaking
branches allow the agency to make. J. LANDIS, supra note 6, at 2-3. This agency law differs
in kind from the law over which courts have the final authority and hence the system requires
that this law should be subject to a quite different and much more limited review.
The drafters of the revised MSAPA also recognized a fundamental distinction between
these two types of issues. Although it lumped these together as "law," it clearly intended
quite different review. The comments suggest that the court review interpretations of law

538

43 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW 511

The system then works from this distinction. If policymaking refers to
the agency's authority to make decisions about collective goals, then the
limits on judicial authority follow. When the law-giving authority leaves to
the agency the power to decide how to advance or protect the collective
goals of the community as a whole, it authorizes the agency to make policy
rather than making the policy itself. It does not ·authorize the courts; as a
result, the courts violate the law if they unduly infer such authority. 148 The
limit is not on the judicial power over law but on judicial power under the
law to exercise a policymaking function assigned elsewhere.
This formulation solves another problem: the place of "common law" or
evolved law in the administrative process. This traditionally is considered
"law" in our legal system and it is not agency law or the exercise of policymaking as I use the term here. Of course, it is not supported by clear
statutory language; yet we find much of our law outside of statutory
language. Indeed the "law" at issue in the seminal Chenery opinion had been
derived by the agency from judicially evolved common law. 149 Although
conceding administrative policymaking authority, the Court held that it was
more capable of interpreting that law than the agency. 150 In the second
Chenery case, the agency was held to have developed policy and hence its
decision, the same as that at issue in the first case, was subject to very limited
reviewY' 1 Common law, where the source is the courts rather than the
agency, is as much "law" for review purposes as is statutory law, where the
source is the legislature rather than the agency.
Once this distinction is recognized, it is apparent that Chevron was merely
applying the "well-established principle of administrative law" compelling
judicial restraint in reviewing administratively developed policy. Rather than.
new limits on the review of law, the problem is its simplistic definition of
the term "law" itself. The criticism has overreacted to the Court's loose
language. In addition to imprecision as to the distinction between legislative
law and policy or agency law, however, the opinion also created some confusion aboutjudicial authority over law.
The opinion created confusion by expressing the "well-established
to see if it "merely disagrees with the agency's interpretation." MSAPA, supra note 2, § 5116 and comment to (c)(4). "By contrast, with regard to the agency's application of the law
to specific situations, the enabling statute normally confers some discretion upon the agency.
Accordingly, a court should find reversible error in the agency's application of the law only
if the agency has improperly exercised its discretion [under the limited review provided elsewhere in the section]." ld. (emphasis added). Thus, in my terms, a court can reverse the
latter "agency law" only if it finds that the agency has "improperly exercised its [policymakingJ discretion."
148. The threshold question may also ask whether the agency's exercise of policymaking
is consistent with the legislative concept. Garland, Deregulation and judicial Review, 98 HARV.
L. REv. 507, 587 ( 1985)("U nder the emerging model, courts ensure not only that fidelity to
congressional purpose marks the outer bounds of agency discretion, but also that it animates
the exercise of that discretion.").
149. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
150. ld. at 88-89.
151. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194,207-08 (1947).
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administrative law principles" counseling judicial respect for the informed
administrative opinions concerning questions of law. Chevron said that "a
court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision" for
that of the agency; it immediately followed that statement by noting "[ w]e
have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an
executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to
administer. ... " 152 In admonishing reviewing courts against freely substituting judgment for the agency's determinations of law, the Court said no
more than that "the principle of deference to administrative interpretations" has been consistently followed. 153 The Court is talking of the "weight"
and "deference" the law has provided for generations. 154 These terms
connote respect; they do not establish binding effect. Such deference is
another "well-established principle of administrative law." 155 Otherwise the
opinion demands only that reviewing courts take care to carry out the will
of Congress as expressed in the statute and not impose their own
judgments. 156
152. Chevron v. Natural Resource Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837,844 (1984) (emphasis
added).
153. (Citing Supreme Court cases decided in 1943, 1944, 1945, and 1953.
154. The Court merely observed that if a court finds the statute clear "that is the end of
the matter." /d. at 842. From this, commentators and lower courts have spawned the useless
review strategy know as the "Chevron two step." Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should
Bind Citizens and the Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. I, 17 (1990).
The Court recently applied the Chevron doctrine in Sullivan v. Everhart, II 0 S. Ct. 960,
964 ( 1990). It asked the two step question:
(I) is the intent of Congress clear;
(2) if not, is the agency's meaning permissible.
The Court held, 5-4, that the Tenth Circuit had misinterpreted the statute. Justice Scalia
first determined that the statute was not clearly against the agency's interpretation. The
dissent, however, asserted that he and four other Justices did not understand the "plain terms
of the statute." /d. at 968 (Stevens, J., dissenting). While it seems odd that a case which could
be decided under the "plain terms of the statute" should even reach the Supreme Court, it
is even more odd that five Justices could not understand that "plain meaning." Because of
his difficulty in grasping the plain meaning of the statute,Justice Scalia was forced to consider
whether the agency's interpretation was "permissible." Having determined that the agency's
interpretation was permissible, Justice Scalia then determined whether the agency's policy
development was arbitrary and concluded that it was not. /d. at 966-67. For me, this case
demonstrates the unnecessary formality of the Chevron doctrine. In Curtin Matheson, Justice
Marshall merely stated that the Board's policymaking was "consistent with the Act." If the
agency's action might be illegal then a court should decide that question. If the agency is
exercising a legitimate policymaking function then the court should test for arbitrariness.
Courts have proceeded in this manner for generations and there seems to be no justification
for adding the structured clumsiness of the Chevron doctrine.
155. See Fallon, supra note 2, at 984 ("At least two kinds of deference are consistent with
the proposition that the power to engage in independent review must be vested in an article
Ill court: deference to an agency's congressionally delegated lawmaking power and deference to an agency's interpretive expertise.").
156. The F AP A provides for review of constitutional issues involved in agency decisions.
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B); see also MSAPA § 5-116(c)(l). Where the law is constitutional law,
deference to the agency interpretation will be slight. Such review is limited because review
of legislation per se is limited. See generally Bice, Rationality Analysis in Constitutional Law, 65
MINN. L. REv. I (1980). Although courts give little deference to agency constitutional judgments, two basic categories of constitutional challenges to agency action are generally subjected
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Any other reading of Chevron would eliminate the well-established
authority and necessary contributions of the courts in interpreting statutory
law and would ignore the other potent and well-established source of law
in Anglo-American jurisprudence: the evolution of law through the common
law process. 157 The Supreme Court gave no indication that it was undertaking such a fundamental change in our legal theory. 158 It merely wanted
the agencies to continue to exercise their policymaking functions within
their well-accepted authority to do so but left to the courts the power to
interpret statutes and otherwise develop law. 159
Thus no change has been made in the "well-established principle of
administrative law" that courts are the final arbiters of questions of law.
While giving deference to agency interpretations, they may uphold the
agency's legal judgments only if they agree. Regardless of the theoretical
debate over the unfortunate "Chevron doctrine," in practice courts gener-

to more limited review. The first, due process, usually involves a constitutional minimum and
a reasonable procedure will probably receive little judicial scrutiny. The second, the nondelegation doctrine, also tends to raise little judicial support. Most administrative law authorities see the doctrine as virtually defunct. E.g., S. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 68-85 (2d ed. 1985). To some extent this limited review can
be attributed to the fact that a challenge to a delegation actually questions the congressional
action, i.e., the delegating statute, rather than the administrative action.
157. Recent decisions suggest that the Court never intended to limit the traditional judicial methods for interpreting statutory language. InK Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct.
181 I ( 1988), the plurality found that "traditional tools of statutory construction" should be
used. /d. at 1822 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). In Public Citizen v. Department
of Justice, I 09 S. Ct. 2558 (1989), a majority of the Court relied on such tools to interpret
a statutory provision. They used legislative history and the canons of construction to determine that Congress had made its intent clear. /d. at 2567, 2572. The concurring justices said
that the "plain language" of the statute determines whether a statutory provision is ambiguous, and since this language was not clear, the Court should have considered deference to
the agency's interpretation. /d. at 2578 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Although upholding the agency, the majority opinion in Rust v. Sullivan, Ill S. Ct. 1759
( 1991 ), seemed to be following the traditional strategy for the review of a regulation. The
challenge, as the Court noted, was limited to the facial legality (and constitutionality) of the
regulation and hence only questions of law were before the Court. Answering the legal challenge, the Court found: "The broad language of [the act] plainly allows the Secretary's
construction of the statute." /d. at - - - · As to the legislative history argument, it said:
"When we find, as we do here, that the legislative history is ambiguous and unenlightening
on the matters with respect to which the regulations deal, we customarily defer to the expertise
of the agency." /d. at ___ (emphasis added). Thus, it held that "[t]he Secretary's regulations are a permissible construction of [the act] ... ."!d. at---·
158. This confusion is reminiscent of that caused by Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387
U.S. 136 (1967), two decades ago. Both had language which suggested that review, either
reviewability in Abbott or standards of review in Chevron, must be based on the clear language
in the statute but did not seem to affirmatively deny the search for law elsewhere.
159. The Supreme Court seems to be struggling to control the extreme readings of Chevron while maintaining the vitality of the law/policy distinction. NLRB v. United Food &
Commercial Workers Union, 108 S. Ct. 413 (1987); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207
(1987).
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ally follow this approach. 160 Thus Justice Marshall applied no "Chevron two
step" in Curtin Matheson; he merely held the Board's decision "consistent
with the Act"-end of analysis. 161

VI. REVIEW OF PROCEDURAL ISSUES
Justice Blackmun's separate dissenting opinion in Curtin Matheson suggests
yet another review strategy. 162 He observed:
Rarely will a court feel so certain of the wrongness of an agency's empirical
judgment that it will be justified in substituting its own view of the facts. But
courts can and should review agency decisionmaking closely to ensure that an
agency has adequately explained the bases for its conclusions, that the various
components of its policy form an internally consistent whole, and that any apparent contradictions are acknowledged and addressed. This emphasis upon the
decisionmaking process allows the reviewing court to exercise meaningful control
over unelected officials without second-guessing the sort of expert judgments
that a court may be ill-equipped to make. Such an approach also affords the
agency a broad range of discretion. 163

He would then have a reviewing court concern itself primarily with the
adequacy of the procedures. 164 This strategy is both too restrained and too
liberated. By using procedure, courts may arrogate power over substance. 165
Or by limiting review to procedural questions, the courts may avoid the
important, if restrained, review of substantive issues. Thus reviewing courts'
authority over procedural questions affect both the procedural and the
substantive review roles.
The "well-established principles of administrative law" dictate that courts
should dominate procedural questions because these issues are similar, or
the same as, issues of law. 166 Courts are free to substitute judgment on
160. The issue becomes, then, whether the role of the court in dealing with a less than
explicit legislative command should change simply because an administrative agency is in
the picture. Certainly, from the standpoint of constitutional regularity, nothing would indicate such an inclination. One may start with the point that the courts were explicitly
contemplated by the Framers, while the agencies were not, or were much less, the objects
of their consideration. Since statutory construction is assigned to the judicial branch by
the Constitution, advocates of change in that allocation should at least bear the burden of
persuasion.
Hirshman, Postmodernjurisprudence and the Problem of Administrative Discretion, 82 Nw. U.L.
REV. 646, 669 ( 1988) (footnotes omitted).
161. NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc. 110 S. Ct. 1542, 1549 (1990).
162. !d. at 1555 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
163. !d. at 1556 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
164. Without using the term,Justice Blackmun may be adopting the "hard look" doctrine,
which requires a court to assure that the agency took a hard look at the questions. See supra
note I 06 and accompanying text.
165. Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1312-14 (1975).
166. Preclusion of question of law precludes review of procedures. Gott v. Walters, 791
F.2d 172 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (en bane); see Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602,615
( 1984) (Under the Medicare Act's preclusion provision, 42 U .S.C. § 405(h), procedural challenges are subsumed within a claim "arising under" a preclusion statute.).
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procedural choices with which they do not agree. judicial dominance is based
on the fact that judges are experts in procedures. Indeed, their procedural
expertise is paramount and the agency's expertise cannot stand up to it even
though the agency is deeply concerned with its own procedures.
On the other hand, the law recognizes that an agency's method of
proceeding is a central concern of that agency. Agencies are experts in their
own procedural requirements and agencies are concerned directly with the
success of their procedures. Courts see only a distorted sample of the results
of those procedures and may not recognize their overall success. Also,judges
tend to evaluate procedural questions according to the dictates of tradition;
the agencies, however, are under some practical pressure to innovate.
In response to these considerations, the law has instructed the courts to
give "great deference" to the agencies; 167 the law has created a rather strong
presumption of regularity. Courts sometimes believe the law binds them to
the procedural judgment of the agency much as in agency dominated
issues 168 but this overstates the restraint. There is little question of judicial
authority to do agreement review; the agency's procedures must comply
with the law and the courts must assure that it does. 169 However, the courts
themselves must obey the law and, despite their unmistakable expertise, are
not free agents in designing procedures.
The leading case, Vermont Yankee, 170 makes this clear. Vermont Yankee
involved judicial authority to add procedures to informal rulemaking. After
a hearing, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) granted petitioners a
license to operate a nuclear power plant. The AEC subsequently instituted
rulemaking proceedings to deal with special environmental effects and
eventually issued a rule about nuclear fuel cycles. Respondents appealed
the fuel cycle rule and the decision to grant a license. The D.C. Circuit held
that the basic notice and comment rulemaking prescribed by APA section
553 was a statutory minimum and in this situation that minimum procedure
was inadequate. The Supreme Court reversed.
Some contend that the Supreme Court's opinion in Vermont Yankee
reversed the long-standing judicial dominance over procedural questions. 171
Yet the Court held no more than that courts are not authorized to impose
procedures in addition to those prescribed by the F APA. 172 True, the opinion contained language which severely restricts judicial authority to develop
167. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976) ("In assessing what process is due in
this case, substantial weight must be given to the good-faith judgments of the individuals
charged by Congress with the administration of social welfare programs that the procedures
they have provided assure fair consideration of the entitlement claims of individuals.").
168. FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279,290-91 (1965).
169. The FAPA expressly provides for such review. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D). While once
again the Act fails to describe the depth of the review it was intended to be what I call
agreement review.
170. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435
U.S. 519 (1978), on remand, 685 F.2d 459 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 2246 (1983).
171. Levin, supra note 2, at 60.
172. 435 U.S. at 524.
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administrative procedures, but such language does not contradict the notion
that the reviewing courts can substitute judgment on procedural questions.
The opinion only makes the self-evident finding that courts, although
free to substitute judgment on questions of law, including procedural law,
are not free to misapply the law. The Supreme Court found the lower court
in Vermont Yankee misinterpreted the law so the Court rejected the lower
court's judgment. Read closely this case, as does Chevron discussed above,
stands for the rather unextraordinary proposition that courts must obey the
law themselves. 173
Judicial dominance over procedural questions similarly was restrained in
Steadman v. SEC. 174 Steadman involved the standard of proof in fraud cases
brought in SEC administrative proceedings. 175 The F APA required the
"preponderance of the evidence" standard in agency adjudications, but
lower courts had ordered the SEC to use a higher standard of proof in fraud
cases. 176 The Court read the F APA as mandating a preponderance of the
evidence standard and held that lower courts lacked the authority to impose
a higher standard of proof. However, the Court said that had there been
no congressionally created standard, as .in a prior case, 177 the lower court
would have been free to impose whatever standard it felt was fair and to
substitute judgment on this procedural question. 178 The Supreme Court
held, however, that the law did not permit the lower court this freedom
where the statutory language was clear. 179
Like other law questions, there are limits on procedural review and an
issue-driven strategy might continue these limits. The court should review
the agency's procedural judgment at three different levels. First and foremost, the court should assure that the agency procedures comply with statutory requirements, both the specific enabling act and the general law
created by the F APA. Second, the court must assure that the procedures
comply with constitutional requirements, particularly due process. Third,
the court must ultimately make its own judgment that the procedures create
fundamental fairness.
The first test in procedural review is, of course, the relevant statute. A
reviewing court must assure that the agency procedures comply with the
relevant statute or congressional intent. After such review, however, it may
be that the Vermont Yankee/Steadman line of cases requires that the courts
themselves stick very closely to the legislation.
This law restricts innovation by the courts but perhaps it could encourage
innovation by the agencies. Under these cases, the agencies are given some
173. See also Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2369,2373 (1988) (making
the same point with respect to court supervision of grand jury investigations).
174. 450 u.s. 91 (1981).
175. /d. at 92.
176. E.g., Collins Sec. Corp. v. SEC, 562 F.2d 820, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
177. Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276,284 (1966).
178. 450 U.S. at 95.
179. /d.
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freedom from stifling judicial review. Unfortunately, agencies are not as
inclined as they might be to experiment with procedures. One review strategy permitted under Vermont Yankee would be to encourage the agency to
engage in innovation.
Regardless, the courts have a continuing duty to test administrative action
against the Constitution. The procedures for many administrative decisions
are not covered by statute, particularly those used for informal adjudication. Where the statute is not clear, the due process test for procedural
decision becomes the dominant source of procedural law. Since the courts
have plenary authority over constitutional law, the courts are very dominant here.
However, the due process authority over procedural questions is much
more substantial than that. Although somewhat inconsistent with the tone
of Vermont Yankee and Steadman, the Supreme Court has established that
due process determinations are dominant even over statutory procedures.
In Arnett v. Kennedy, 180 Justice Rehnquist suggested the "bitter with the
sweet" doctrine. 181 This doctrine would limit due process analysis in much
the same way as Vermont Yankee limits the courts in other regards. It would
create per se compliance with due process where the statute that established
the entitlement to a right also set the procedures for vindication of that
right. 182 The Supreme Court in Loudermill' 83 expressly rejected this doctrine.
Therefore, even where the agency follows procedures set by statute, the
court must make an independent judgment as to whether those procedures
comply with due process. In other words, at least at the due process level,
the Vermont Yankee line of cases has no force.
The third possible procedural review is whether the procedures violate
the court's sense of fundamental fairness. Recent Supreme Court decisions
such as Vermont Yankee seem to limit the court's ability to free-lance in this
way. Somewhere between due process and interpretation of the statutory
requirement, Vermont Yankee, however, may still have left some authority
in the courts to review procedures that violate fundamental fairness. One
clear example of this gap would be where the statute neither establishes the
procedure nor gives the agency the authority to do so. 184 Here, even under
Vermont Yankee, the court need not look to the Constitution or due process
alone to find authority to closely scrutinize procedures for fairness.
Although not as restrictive as some contend, Vermont Yankee does confine
judicial review of procedural issues. Here the issue-driven strategy serves
the purpose of opening the debate over the advisability of judicial intervention in procedural questions. Where Congress has in fact intentionally
set the procedures, a court should treat that decision with the same respect
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

416 u.s. 134 (1974).
/d. at 152-54.
/d.
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 540-41 (1985).
450 U.S. at 95.
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the judiciary is to accord other legislative judgments. However, where the
agency sets the procedures, courts should be free to apply their special
procedural expertise to those administrative judgments. If they object to
the agency's procedural judgment, they should take care to justify their
intervention and they should accord the agency's procedural judgment the
traditional great deference. Many judges have an unfortunate predisposition towards increasing procedures and this predisposition must be
tempered. 185 Nonetheless, conceding the advantages of deference and judicial restraint, courts should have an active role as to procedural law.
I would hope then that the issue-driven strategy might change the nature
of the debate. It might temper some of the confrontational aspects and lead
the courts and the agencies to work in concert to develop procedural innovations for particular administrative programs. This cooperation is possible
even under current law but the law might allow the courts more freedom
in order to take full advantage of their substantial procedural expertise.
VII. REVIEW OF DISCRETION
The last element of an issue-driven review strategy is the designation of
the judicial role with respect to administrative discretion. In Curtin Matheson, the majority summarized: "We hold that the Board acted within its
discretion in refusing to adopt a presumption of replacement opposition to
the union .... " 186 The tone of this statement suggests that the Court
believed it had little, if any, authority over the valid exercise of administrative discretion.
However, "discretion" is a slippery, although vital, term in administrative
law. 187 Indeed, administrative law uses the term in a variety of different
senses, each suggesting different review strategies. 188 In a general sense,
discretion connotes a sense of both authority and decision making freedom.
Thus, to determine the judicial role with respect to issues resolved by the
exercise of administrative discretion, the review system must be sensitive to
the different types of authority and the various levels of decisionmaking
freedom.
185. S. BREYER, supra note 48, at 34 7 ("Critics of procedural expansion are "uncertain
whether the more elaborate procedures have changed substantive results or have led to more
accurate decision making.").
186. NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 1542, 1544 (1990).
18 7. The classic legal theory description of discretion was provided by Hart and Sacks.
For them, discretion is "the power to choose between two or more courses of action each of
which is thought of as permissible." H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCF.SS: BASIC
PROBLF.MS IN THF. MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 162 (1958). In the administrative law
context, this definition is inconsequential. Even under the substantial evidence test an agency
decision must be accepted if the court finds that the agency chose one among several acceptable positions. I KocH Surr., supra note 2, at 34.
188. I have observed five distinct uses of the term: three designating decision making that
is subjected to different levels of review and two designating unreviewable administrative
decisionmaking. Koch, supra note 137, at 470-71.
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Administrative law has been evolving such a system. Conscious and orderly
application of the principles being developed will provide the necessary
judicial sensitivity to the distinct judicial role with respect to each sense of
the term. The first level distinction is between discretion subject to some
review and that made unreviewable.
Reviewable discretion
The current law has evolved several strategies with respect to reviewable
discretion under the single word formula "abuse of discretion." 189 As with
the other issue-oriented approaches, this strategy has evolved because courts
recognize instinctively the different senses of authority and decision making
freedom at work in the exercise of discretion before them rather than a
formalistic application of the "abuse of discretion" word formula. In
conducting abuse of discretion review, courts consider the nature of the
relevant grant of discretion and then the meaning of the term "abuse" in
the context of that type of discretion.
The existence of discretion creates a tension between the authority of the
courts and that of the agency exercising the discretion. Where the discretion is reviewable, that review must vary in accordance with the nature of
the authority intended in the grant of discretion. A reviewing court must
strive to recognize the appropriate administrative authority in order to
implement the intended allocation of decisionmaking responsibility.
Several factors justify measuring review according to the authority implicated in the grant of administrative discretion. Administrative systems that
employ discretion are designed with the agencies, not the courts, having
the primary decisionmaking responsibility. The grant of discretion is usually
related to agency expertise, including specialized knowledge and experience. Although the courts may make informed judgments about many of
these issues, the agencies often have a comparative advantage. The comparative advantage, however, differs among programs. Thus, the extent to
which the agency authority is to be dominant over the judicial authority
varies among such programs. The nature of the discretion conveys the allocation of authority. 190
189. This word formula appears in the FAPA. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
190. In light of the different senses of authority conveyed by the term, I have suggested
that the abuse of discretion word formula requires a different review strategy for each of
the three reviewable senses of discretion I have observed. 2 KocH, SUPP., supra note 2, at
§ 9.7.
We have already confronted one major use of the term: the authority and freedom to make
policy. Justice Marshall in Curtin Matheson used the term in this sense. As suggested in that
opinion, courts have the authority to review administrative policymaking but that authority
is very limited. As discussed above, this limited judicial authority over policymaking is more
often communicated through the arbitrariness standard than the abuse of discretion standard. No matter the word formula, very restrained review is well established.
Administrative law also uses the term discretion to describe a narrower authority and freedom: the discretion to fill in the gaps in legislation. I have labeled this sense of discretion as
"executing discretion." Executing discretion is quite different from policymaking even though
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The determination of what constitutes "abuse" recognizes the decisionmaking freedom conveyed by the grant of discretion. The term communicates a very limited role for the reviewing courts. Abuse, like arbitrariness,
suggests that the courts are to interfere only if they find the administrative
decisionmaking to be particularly egregious. Indeed, in this sense the two
standards are roughly equivalent. 191 Abuse, as does arbitrariness, instructs
reviewing courts to tolerate a relatively high risk of error. Thereby, the
abuse standard preserves the administrative discretion while assigning to
the courts responsibility for preventing intolerable exercises of such
discretion.
Unreviewable discretion
Agency authority and decisionmaking freedom over certain issues may
be so extensive that the courts may have no residual authority (although
some other institution might) and hence resolution of those issues may be
unreviewable. Here, it is particularly important to remember that a given
administrative decision incorporates the resolution of a bundle of issues.
Some of the issues in the decision may be reviewable while others are not.
The entire decision will be unreviewable only if none of the controverted
issues resolved by the decision are reviewable. 192 For example, Veterans
Administration decisions were expressly unreviewable but the Supreme
Court ruled that controverted constitutionality issues contained in those
decisions were still reviewable. 193 Later, Congress provided for review of
they both relate to incomplete legislation. Policymaking is not merely the power to extend
legislation or fill in detail; rather, policymaking is the authority to define the path by which
the legislative goals are to be attained. In the exercise of executing discretion, the agency
merely follows a path defined by the legislation. A reviewing court can evaluate the exercise
of this type of authority more intensely than it can policymaking because the court can test
these implementing judgments against the narrow confines of the legislative prescription.
Judicial authority here could be quite extensive.
The most prevalent sense of discretion is quite different from the other two reviewable
senses of the term. It implicates administrative authority to engage in individual decisionmaking, and hence I have labeled this as "individualizing discretion." Agencies may have
express or inherent authority to make adjustments in the way they apply statutory standards
or administrative rules in individual situations. Commentators have long recognized this sense
of discretion. E.g., K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY jUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 25 (1969)
("Discretion is a tool, indispensable for individualization of justice .... Rules alone, untempered by discretion, cannot cope with the complexities of modern government and of modern
justice."); j. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC jUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY
CLAIMS I 07 (1983) ("Rulemaking necessarily constrains sensitive exercise of individualized
discretion."). Individualizing discretion allows the process to be sensitive, fair and efficient;
hence a reviewing court should approach this type of discretion with a positive attitude.
Because most courts already recognize the positive aspects of such discretion, they rarely
undertake extensive review unless they find the particular exercise of such individualizing
discretion well beyond the range of plausible deviations from the standard or rule.
191. As the Restatement of Scope-of-Review Doctrine by the ABA Section of Administrative Law found: "No distinctions are drawn among the terms 'arbitrary, capricious, [or]
an abuse of discretion' in § 706(2)(A)." Levin, supra note 63, at 292.
192. Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602,614 (1984) (Any claim "inextricably intertwined"
with an unreviewable claim will also be unreviewable.).
193. johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
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these veterans' benefits decisions but it retained unreviewability for questions of fact. 194
Often, the unreviewability of an issue is conveyed by the term "discretion." Still, not all discretion is unreviewable. Further inquiry is necessary
to determine whether the particular issue involves one of the term's two
unreviewable senses. Discretion may refer to an issue made unreviewable
by statute or other law. The term may also cover the administrative resolution of issues which are inherently unsuitable for review.
(a) Unbridled discretion. The first category of unreviewability defines
administrative decisions that the empowering authority or existing law has
shielded from judicial scrutiny. There is no universal justification to support
completely removing these issues from review. Nothing inherent in the kinds
of issues made unreviewable suggests that courts could not perform some
useful function. Usually it seems that the reasons for unreviewability are
either to avoid any judicial interference or to cut the cost of the program. 195
Still, some review, albeit limited, does not seem clearly inappropriate even
for these reasons. Yet the political authority or tradition, for some reason,
deemed it advisable to give the agency the final word and created a sense
of the term "discretion" conveying unreviewability. 196
To use the terminology of the FAPA, this unreviewability can be created
either by statute 197 or "by law." 198 Both state and federal administrative law
recognize that either a statute or the common law might prevent judicial
intervention in the administrative determination as to certain issues. Because
the federal act incorporates both, it is useful to discuss the law as it has been
applied by federal courts.
The first provision, section 701 (a)( 1), merely incorporates any enabling
act that expressly precludes review. Interpretation of the provision has not
caused much trouble. The pendulum has swung back and forth between
the Abbott 199 doctrine requiring the unreviewability within the statutory
language and the acceptance of other evidence of legislative intent to make

194. 2 KOCH SUPP., supra note 2, at 130-31.
195. For example, according to the Supreme Court, the purpose of unreviewability in the
provision covering the Veterans' Administration, 38 U .S.C. § 211 (a) is the technical nature
of the decisions and administrative and judicial costs. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 370
(1974); see also Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 106 S. Ct. 2133, 213940 ( 1986). Congress may have also precluded judicial review to eliminate any sense of adversariness between the government and veterans. Note, The Case for judicial Review of Veterans'
Administration Benefit Determinations, 2 AUMIN. L.J. 217, 235-36 (1988).
196. Dworkin, The Model Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14 (1967), reprinted in R. DwoRKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 32 (1977) ("Sometimes we use the term [discretion] in a ... weak
sense, to say only that some official has final au,thority to make a decision and cannot be
reviewed and reversed by any other official.").
197. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(l) (Review provided "except to the extent that- (I) statutes preclude
judicial review").
198. 5 U .S.C. § 70 I (a)(2) (Review provided "except to the extent that- (2) agency action
is committed to agency discretion by law").
199. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967).
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the decision unreviewable. 200 At present the latter seems to be the law. 201
The second provision, section 701 (a)(2), has caused more definitional
problems. Interpretation of this provision involves an analysis of the type
of "discretion" covered and of the type of "law" which can create such
unreviewable discretion. The major source of confusion is the phrase "by
law" and that vague phrase has caused problems for generations. What "law"
does the provision include? Since subsection (a)( 1) expressly covers all
unreviewability expressly provided by statute, subsection (a)(2) must cover
some other sources of unreviewability. This law must be that created by
the grant of preemptive administrative authority and decisionmaking freedom in the statutory scheme, the common law evolution, or the
Constitution. 202
One type of "law" that might create unreviewable discretion is statutory
law. As recognized by subsection (a)(l), a statute might expressly preclude
review. However, a statute may also imply unreviewability, as recognized
by subsection (a)(2), by granting the full decisionmaking authority to the
agency. The famous Overton Park opinion described the nature of this source
of unreviewable discretion. 203
In Overton Park, a public interest group challenged the Secretary of Transportation's decision to authorize the use of federal funds to finance the
construction of a highway through a Memphis park. The Court was
compelled to engage in an in-depth analysis of its role in such informal
decisionmaking. It ultimately concluded that the proper judicial role was
the very restrained arbitrariness standard. Nonetheless, it first asked whether
the decision was reviewable at all. Since the statute did not expressly preclude
review, the remaining basis for unreviewability was the nature of the discretion. Based in part on the legislative history of the FAPA, 204 the Court found
that unreviewable "absolute discretion" existed when the statute left the
courts "no law to apply," that is, the statute lacked meaningful standards
whereby a reviewing court might evaluate the agency's exercise of discre-

200. 2 KOCH SUPP., supra note 2, at § 9.32.
201. Compare Block v. Community Nutrition lnst., 467 U.S. 340,351 (1984) (Review can
be precluded by specific language or specific legislative intent that is " 'fairly discernible' in
the detail of the legislative scheme.") and United States v. Fausto, 108 S. Ct. 668, 675-76
(1988) with Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, I 06 S. Ct. 2133, 2139 (1986).
202. Although the only member of the Court to recognize the breadth of the term "law"
as used in § 70 I (a)(2), Justice Scalia confused the point by relying heavily on statutory interpretation to find the "common law." Webster v. Doe, I 08 S. Ct. 204 7, 2055-63 ( 1988) (Scalia,
J., dissenting). The boundary between statutory interpretation and evolved law is indeed
sometimes murky, but justice Scalia's resolution conceptually puts him in a curious position
vis-a-vis judicial activism. If statutory interpretation is common law then is it not in the domain
of the judiciary?
203. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,410 (1971).
204. S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945), reprinted in LEGISLATI\'E HISTORY
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 212 (1946) ("If, for example, statutes are drawn
in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply, courts of course have no
statutory question to review.").
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tion. 205 This analysis established a fairly straightforward and often cited test
for determining whether Congress had so committed the decision to the
agency's authority as to preclude all judicial involvement. 206
But statutory law is not the only "law" that might create absolute, and
hence unreviewable, discretion. Another "law" that might create unreviewable discretion is the "common law" or traditional principles. This law is
judge-made but is nonetheless very strongly rooted in our system. 207
Traditional or common law, for example, has evolved unreviewability for
the exercise of "prosecutorial" discretion. The Supreme Court's Heckler v.
Chaney opinion demonstrates the persistence of the tradition of unreviewable prosecutorial discretion. 208 The case arose in a bizarre factual setting
but the nature of the administrative action offered the opportunity for a
concept of modest review of the initiation-type decisions covered by the
concept of prosecutorial discretion. Prison inmates brought actions to compel
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to take enforcement action against
the use of lethal injections to carry out the death penalty, arguing that the
drugs used were not approved by the FDA for human executions. The issue
was whether the decision not to act against this drug use was committed to
agency discretion in a way that precluded review. 209 The district court, the
circuit court, and the Supreme Court all began with the test for reviewability in Overton Park, which is whether a meaningful standard exists by
which to evaluate the agency's decision. 210 Applying this test, the Court in
Heckler found no controlling standard and hence held that the FDA's decision was unreviewable. However, the statute provided a meaningful standard thatjudges could apply. 211 The real basis of the opinion was the well205. HOUSE COMM. ON THE jUDICIARY, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., APP. TO Arr'y GEN.
STATEMENT (Comm. Print 1945), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 413-14 (1946).
206. Although well established, this concept may run afoul of the nondelegation doctrine.
Doesn't delegation without meaningful standards create a per se violation of the nondelegation doctrine, even in its weak modern version? While that question is beyond the scope
of this article, the answer may lie in this article's foundational concept that administrative
decisions result from the resolution of a bundle of issues. Thus, although an issue, even a
crucial issue, may be left to the agency's unbridled discretion, still the decisionmaking itself
will be sufficiently retained to survive the nondelegation doctrine.
207. NLRB v. United Food and Commercial Workers' Union, 108 S. Ct. 413,422 (1987)
(reading preclusion of review of settlement decisions into the NLRB as an exercise of prosecutorial discretion.).
208. 470 u.s. 821 (1985).
209. /d. at 823.
210. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,410-13 (1971).
211. While it is true that, as Justice Rehnquist points out, nothing in the statute compels
the Secretary to bring a case, the sections cited by the Court itself contain meaningful standards. 4 70 U.S. at 835-37. The injunction section, 21 U .S.C. § 332, refers to a section listing
"prohibited acts" (21 U .S.C. § 331 ), and the seizure section, 21 U .S.C. § 334, creates liability
for "adulterated or misbranded" goods (as the Court recognized § 352 further defines
misbranded). These are standards that the Court regularly finds meaningful and applies. In
short, there was sufficient "law to apply" and hence the Court had the capacity to review in
accordance with these standards but for the traditional acceptance of unbridled prosecutorial
discretion.
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established principle against review of prosecutorial discretion.
The Court started with the presumption that a decision not to act involved
unreviewable prosecutorial discretion. 212 This unreviewability, it found,
evolved into a well-established doctrine that was not changed by the
FAPA. 213 As Justice Rehnquist stated: "For good reasons, such a decision
[whether to bring enforcement action or not] has traditionally been
'committed to agency discretion,' and we believe that the Congress enacting
the AP A did not intend to alter that tradition. (APA did not significantly
alter the 'common law' of judicial review of agency action.)" 214 Thus, the
Court actually based its finding of unreviewability on tradition and not on
the absence of standards.
The law that makes prosecutorial discretion unreviewable has evolved
over time and that law is judge-made common law. What judges have made
they can unmake if they have sound reason for doing so. 215 It is true that
often the relevant prosecutorial decisions involve the necessary and beneficial discretion to individualize in order to allow the system to do individual
justice. While this might justify some limits on review of this individualizing
discretion, it does not justify complete unreviewability. Prosecutors and other
law enforcement officials should not be inflexible even where the law is
clear, but their decisions need not be unreviewable. In most other countries
prosecutors' decisions are in fact reviewable. 216 Despite significant arguments
against unbridled prosecutorial discretion, 217 however, the view persists that
our system cannot permit review.
Tradition as the basis for unreviewability was also the actual concept at
work in the more recent Webster v. Doe opinion. 218 The majority held that
a CIA termination decision was so committed to agency discretion as to
preclude review, except for serious constitutional questions. 219 Justice Scalia,
dissenting, found constitutional questions precluded as well. He agreed with
the assertion made above that the "no law to apply" test does not describe

212. As I have noted previously, there is a natural distinction between a decision not to
act and mere delay. 2 KOCH SUPP., supra note 2, at § 9.21. In at least some types of cases,
review of decisions not to act is practical.
213. 470 U.S. at 831-32.
214. /d. at 832 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
215. Even Chaney may not support an extreme view of prosecutorial discretion. Sunstein,
Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 675 (1985) ("It
would probably be a mistake to read Chaney as establishing a general rule of nonreviewability
for enforcement decisions. The opinion is filled with more than the usual number of disclaimers."). See also Note, The Scope of Review of Agencies' Refusals to Enforce or Promulgate Rules, 53
CEO. WASH. L. REV. 86, 104, 117 (1984-85).
216. E.g., Langbein, Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion in Germany, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 439,
463-66 (1974).
217. See Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560,568-74 (1975).
218. 108 S. Ct. 2047 (1988).
219. /d. at 2053.
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the full reach of section 701 (a)(2) preclusion 220 and he recognized that the
"law" that precludes review may be common law. 221 This common law, he
observed, constitutes "a body of jurisprudence that had marked out, with
more or less precision, certain issues and certain areas that were beyond
the range of judicial review." 222 The personnel decision at issue in Webster,
like prosecutorial decisions, was traditionally unreviewable.
Having recognized the common law genesis of the relevant discretion,
Justice Scalia articulated theoretical support for a contraction of unreviewability "by law. " 223 Unfortunately, Justice Scalia never confronted the question as to whether judges could change this common law. 224
The third type of "law" that creates unreviewable discretion is the
Constitution. For example, the conduct of military or foreign affairs is
unreviewable by constitutional "law." 225 In Webster, for example, Justice
Scalia could rely not only on the common law but also the Constitution.
Such decisions differ from traditionally unreviewable discretion in that
the "law" making it unreviewable has some constitutional base. 226 There is
a very strong separation of powers argument that supports the conclusion
that such decisions are entirely within the constitutional powers of the executive and the judicial branch is precluded from involving itself in them.
Unlike the common law source of unreviewability, constitutionally based
unreviewability is unassailable directly. When the "law" that creates the
unreviewable discretion is founded on constitutional principles then changes
in that law may be beyond the power of the judicial branch.
220. /d. at 2056 ( 1988) (Scalia, J ., dissenting) ("The 'no law to apply' test can account for
the nonreviewability of certain issues, but falls far short of explaining the full scope of the
areas from which the courts are excluded [by§ 701(a)(2)]."). "The Court could clarify its
analysis by explicitly acknowledging what it is already doing implicitly: it should cease treating
the 'law to apply' test as the exclusive standard for identifying actions that are 'committed
to agency discretion.' " Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 MINN.
L. REv.689,734(1990).
221. I 08 S. Ct. at 2056 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
222. /d.
223. Regardless, both Chaney and Webster make reversal of this law unlikely in the foreseeable future. The "law" of prosecutorial discretion will continue to give the agencies extreme
dominance over decisions within that category. The position here is that Chaney's extreme
position is unnecessary. Some see it as an incorrect reading of the law. Davis, "No Law to
Apply," 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. I, II (1988) ("Even if a reviewing court takes the position
that it has no law to apply, it normally can and should exercise judicial discretion in deciding
whether the agency has abused its discretion.") (emphasis in original).
224. "The Supreme Court should acknowledge the common law role that it, in any event,
obviously feels impelled to play. It could do so by replacing the formalistic Overton Park
analysis with a pragmatic approach to section 70 I (a)(2)." Levin, supra note 219, at 741. Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of"Committed to Agency Discretion," 82 HARV. L.
REv. 367 ( 1968) offered some useful considerations for determining whether unreviewability
should continue.
225. E.g., Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355, 1356 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984); Dickson v. Ford, 521 F.2d 234, 235-36 (5th Cir. 1975) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 954 ( 1976).
226. In our early constitutional history, there was no acceptance of absolute prosecutorial
discretion. See Heckler v. Chaney, I 05 S. Ct. 1649, 1663-65 (1985) (Marshall,J., concurring).
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Justice Scalia severely criticized the majority for leaving this door open:
In sum, it is simply untenable that there must be a judicial remedy for every
constitutional violation. Members of Congress and the supervising officers of
the Executive Branch take the same oath to uphold the Constitution that we do,
and sometimes they are left to perform that oath unreviewed, as we always are. 227

Justice Scalia further admonished the Court:
The harm done by today's decision is that, contrary to what Congress knows is
preferable, it brings a significant decisionmaking process of our intelligence
services into a forum where it does not belong. Neither the Constitution, nor
our laws, nor common sense gives an individual a right to come into court to
litigate the reasons for his dismissal as an intelligence agent. It is of course not
just valid constitutional claims that today's decision makes the basis for judicial
review ... but all colorable constitutional claims, whether meritorious or not. ...
Today's result ... will have ramifications far beyond creation of the world's
only secret intelligence agency that must litigate the dismissal of its agents. If
constitutional claims can be raised in this highly sensitive context, it is hard to
imagine where they cannot. The assumption that there are any executive decisions that cannot be hauled into the courts may no longer be valid. Also obsolete
may be the assumption that we are capable of preserving a sensible common law
of judicial review. 228

This then becomes the domain of conflicting theories of constitutional
interpretation. If one sees the courts' power as severely limited then any
unreviewability grounded in the Constitution will rarely be changed. 229
Nonetheless, within the confines of proper constitutional interpretation,
courts may still have some room to narrow the scope of unreviewable
discretion. 230
(b) Inherently unreviewable discretion. In administrative decisionmaking,
there is a second category of unreviewable discretion: issues that are by
nature unsuitable for review. 231 We use the word discretion to identify this
type of issue and use of the term here differs from all other forms of discretion. Indeed, it differs from any other form of decisionmaking. It is unique
because it cannot be tested according to any sense of error or even probability of error. The process for resolving this form of discretion appears
more like intuition than judgment. Many have noted similar issues in other
227. I 08 S. Ct. at 2059 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
228. /d. at 2062-63.
229. The Webster majority suggests also that Congress may limit the courts' constitutional
review. /d. at 2053.
230. See INS v. Abudu, I 08 S. Ct. 904, 912-15 (1988) (subjecting a foreign affairs related
decision to abuse of discretion review); 2 KOCH SUPP., supra note 2, at 135-36.
231. In a mischievous moment, I labeled such decisionmaking as "numinous discretion."
Koch, supra note 137, at 502.

554

43 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW 51 l

legal decisionmaking 232 but such issues seem particularly important in the
administrative process.
Jurisprudential literature tends to refer to it as the "strong sense" of
discretion or it could be called "pure" discretion. 233 For such decisionmaking, any standard that might be found or derived from the grant of authority only guides the decisionmaking; it cannot control its exercise. In making
such decisions, the official, as Dworkin observed, "can be criticized, but not
for being disobedient." 234 Dworkin urged that judges do not have this type
of discretion but, even accepting this conclusion, 235 his observation does not
deny the possible existence of such discretion in the hands of at least some
administrative decisionmakers.
Justice O'Connor conceded that such discretion does exist in the administrative process. 236 She observed: "Some decisions, in short, may turn more
on experience and intuition than on any listing of reasons, factors, standards, or the like. " 237 Others have wrestled with the indisputable existence
of "unknowable" elements in administrative decisions 238 and have observed
this form of administrative decisionmaking. 239
Jaffe observed this form of administrative decision making which he also

232. DwORKIN, supra note 195, at 31-39 (distinguishing the "strong" sense of discretion
from other uses of the term); Rosenberg, judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from
Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 637 (1971) (distinguishing primary and secondary discretion); see also Greenawalt, Discretion and judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest for the Fetters that
Bind judges, 7 5 COLUM. L. REV. 359 ( 1975); Christie, An Essay on Discretion, 1986 DUKE L.J.
747.
233. Dworkin has explained the meaning of this strong sense of the term:
Sometimes we use "discretion" in a weak sense, simply to say that for some reason the
standards an official must apply cannot be applied mechanically but demand the use of
judgment ....
. . . We use "discretion" sometimes not merely to say that an 'official must use judgment
in applying the standards set [fori him by authority, or that no one will review that exercise
of judgment, but to say that on some issue he is simply not bound by standards set by the
authority in question ....
. . . An official's discretion means not that he is free to decide without recourse to standards of sense and fairness, but only that his decision is not controlled by a standard furnished
by the particular authority we have in mind when we raise the question of discretion. Of
course this latter sort of freedom is important; that is why we have the strong sense of
discretion. Someone who has discretion in this [strong] sense can be criticized, but not for
being disobedient. ...
Dworkin, supra note 195, at 31-33.
234. /d. at 33.
235. Dworkin's view challenges the positivist approach. H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw
138-44 (1961). It continues to be a controversial issue. E.g., Greenawalt, supra note 231, at
366-68; MacCormick, Discretion and Rights, 8 LAW & PHIL. 23, 35-36 (1989); Waluchow,
Strong Discretion, 33 THE PHIL. Q. 321 (1983).
236. O'Connor, Reflections on Preclusion ofjudicial Review in England and the United States,
27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 643, 654-55 (1986).
237. /d. at 655. She cited an oriental parable quoted in my treatise (2 KOCH, supra note
2, at 147 n.7) that suggests the practical necessity of such decisionmaking.
238. R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO, & P. VERKUIL, supra note 34, at § 7 .3.4.
239. J. MASHAW, supra note 189, at 67 (described as "clinical intelligence" involving "the
feel or craft of decisionmakers").
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called discretion. 240 He recognized that review of those decisions he included
under the term "discretion" involves a variety of different functions based
on the fundamental existence of "a purported application of the statutory
grants of power to the facts as found. " 241 He separated these grants according to the three types of "rules" they might create. 242 Two of these three
types involve decisionmaking where the application of facts is conclusive.
In contrast, the third type of decisionmaking is entirely different in character: the authorization merely suggests what type o( facts are relevant but
does not make them conclusive. 243
The essence of such decision making is that knowable factors pass through
the appropriate administrative process towards a decision. Jaffe explained
that this type of discretion
compels the administrator to resort to a whole complex of additional concepts
and attitudes, official and personal, ... some of which he may not express, some
of which he may be unaware of.... The mind focuses attention for a period of
time on a group of authoritative decisional factors. But ultimately it reaches
decision by an intuitive leap. 244

The bureaucratic process here then can be understood in terms of an intuitive mental process. 245
Intuition is knowing without conscious reasoning; it is the ability of the
subconscious mind to synthesize variables in a more complex way than can
the conscious mind. 246 In some cases, we seem to make better decisions
through such mental processes than we make through more rational processes.247 For example, if asked to select drapes, we would do better simply
240. L. JAFFE, supra note 76, at 555-56.
241. /d.at555.
242. /d.
243. /d.
244. /d. at 555-56; see also Hart, Problems of Philosophy of Law in 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY 264, 270 (P. Edward ed. 1972).
245. J. MASHAW, supra note 189, at 75-76: "[T]here is some desire that adjudicative
personnel exercise not only a relatively controllable systematic rationality but also a relatively
uncontrollable intuitive rationality. By intuitive rationality I mean an exercise of judgment
that is not explained, or perhaps explainable, through a reasoned connection of value premises ·and factual findings." /d.
246. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PSYCHOLOGY 605 (D. Benner ed. 1985) (citing H. KOHUT, THE
RESTORATION OF THE SELF ( 1977)) (defining intuition as "observation conclus;ons that occur
very quickly of an unconscious level").
247. For whatever it is worth, recent social psychology research has demonstrated that a
conscious, rational mental process does not always lead to a better decision. See generally S.
FISKE & S. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION, 399-402 (2d ed. 1991). One recent study is particularly interesting. Wilson & Schooler, Thinking Too Much: Introspection Can Reduce the Quality
of Preference & Decisions, 60 j. OF PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 181, 190 ( 1991 ). The
researchers evaluated certain types of choices in terms of the subjects' satisfaction and found
that "rational" decisionmaking produced inferior choices in terms of the subjective preferences of those subjects. One study, evaluating student course selection, suggested that some
choices might be objectively inferior as well. That study found that the "rational" choices were
inferior to the "intuitive" choices when measured against the opinions of the faculty and the
recommendations of students who have previously taken the course.
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selecting the drapes than setting out the characteristics of the "correct"
drapes and then trying to pick the drapes according to that description.
The equivalent of intuitive judgme'lt in a bureaucracy is combining various talents and strengths in a group decisionmaking process. This blending
of decisionmaking elements creates what might be called "decisional synergism. " 248 Blending the experience and knowledge of a number of individuals develops a better decision than does the sum of each individual's
experience and expertise. 249
One of the advantages of the administrative process is that it can create
diverse groups of decisionmakers and bring them to bear in a variety of
combinations, producing the synergistic effect necessary to the exercise of
inherent discretion. Just as an individual thinking intuitively synthesizes an
immeasurable array of data, an administrative process can bring together
a variety of instincts, values, sensitivities, experience, and knowledge. The
administrative process replicates that mental process by bringing together
people who are likely to represent this complex array of factors. Just as we
might feel more confident with an interior designer's choice of drapes, we
look to the design of the institutional decisionmaking process to assure the
best resolution of this type of discretion.
There is a tendency to view the exercise of inherent discretion as the
suspension of reasoned or considered decisionmaking. However, when
correctly applied, it is not only a proper administrative function, it is also
one of the strengths of the administrative process. A court that fails to allow
for such decision making robs the administrative process of its richness and
eliminates one of its greatest strengths.
Finding that the decision involves such discretion, the court must take
care. Since it cannot judge the exercise of inherent discretion according to
any standard, it can only destroy the vitality of the exercise if it attempts
to interfere. By its nature, only one authority can exercise such discretion.2''0 If the court attempts to evaluate the administrative exercise, it will
in essence be substituting its judgment for that of the agency intended to

248. Koch, Confining judicial Authority Over Administrhtive Action, 49 Mo. L. REV. 183, 213
(1984).
249. S. BREYER, supra note 48, at 112 ("The Environmental Protection Agency, for example, divided the problem of setting water pollution standards among several of its divisions;
it staffed different divisions with people possessing different professional backgrounds (lawyers,
business graduates, scientists); and it deliberately encouraged argument among them, in hope
of giving top decision makers a more objective view."). As another observer of the administrative process expressed it: "Bureaucracy ... is not an impersonal machine but a social
system, a way of mobilizing all aspects of the human personality in order to transform individuals into a functioning group." Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 1277, 1318 (1984).
250. Maurice Rosenberg called this sense of discretion "primary discretion." The choice
made by a person exercising primary discretion, he contended, is by definition the "correct"
choice. The correctness of the choice cannot be attacked because there are no external criteria on which to base such an attack. Rosenberg, supra note 231, at 639-40.
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exercise the judgment. 251 The drafters of the FAPA understood this and
built it into the concept of unreviewability: "Matters of discretion are necessarily exempted from the section, since otherwise courts would in effect
supersede agency functioning. " 252
The court simply cannot review the exercise of this discretion as such in
the way it reviews all other issues. As Dworkin said of "strong" discretion:
"An official's discretion means not that he is free to decide without recourse
to standards of sense and fairness, but only that his decision is not controlled
by a standard furnished by the particular authority .... " 253 Further, Jaffe
suggests that the agency "may freely use all permissible elements, though
an excessive emphasis on one to the exclusion of other elements may be an
'abuse of discretion.' " 254 Evidence must be available that the agency
included all relevant factors in the exercise.
Most importantly, however, the court must assure that the decision
resulted from the proper and anticipated mix of decisionmaking elements
in order to take the fullest advantage of decisional synergism. Thus, it must
assure that the process meaningfully incorporated all the different instincts,
expertise, and values that the legislature intended to be brought to bear on
the question, or that should ordinarily be brought to bear, where the legislature has not demonstrated an intent. The court must also assure the integrity of the process. The exercise of discretion must not be made in an
environment of bias or political pressure. 255 Nonetheless, as to the exercise
of inherent discretion itself, review is precluded by the nature of the decisionmaking itself. 2 5 6
251. To see the rationale behind this proposition, consider the situation in which a statute
instructs an agency to distribute benefits by lottery. The court simply could not "review"
the core decision without destroying the random result. Inherently unreviewable discretion
is not the result of random choice but it is similar in that the court cannot interfere without
destroying the intended decisionmaking process.
252. H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1946), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 275 (1946).
253. R. DwORKIN, supra note 195, at 33.
254. L. JAFFE, supra note 76, at 556.
255. 2 KOCH, supra note 2, at 153-54.
256. Ronald Levin contended that administrative decisions are always reviewable. Levin,
supra note 219, at 693. The misunderstanding stems from a failure to view administrative
decisions as a bundle of issues. An issue, even a pivotal issue, in a particular decision may be
resolved by the exercise of inherently unreviewable discretion and yet the decision may include
resolution of other reviewable issues. Where the agency's resolution of these other issues is
not disputable, the only controverted issue will involve inherently unreviewable discretion.
In which case, the particular decision will be totally unreviewable but need not have been.
Levin noted my example of the infamous FDA peanut butter rule. /d. at 694 n.22. I observed
that the real problem with the peanut butter rule was not the procedures but the nature of
the issue the FDA was trying to resolve through the procedures. Koch, supra note 137, at
504-05 ( 1986). It simply could not demonstrate the correctness of the choice between 90
percent and 87Y2 percent as the appropriate level of peanuts in peanut butter. No matter
how much procedure it employed, ultimately the choice had to be the result of its institutional process. Because of the nature of the choice, a court could not review that choice.
True, a court could ask whether the choice was within FDA's legal authority, for example,
but that was not controverted. In a sense then, the decision was potentially reviewable for
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Conclusions about review of discretion
In sum, "well-established principles of administrative law" suggest that a
court reviewing "discretion" must take care about the meaning of the term.
Agencies have dominance over issues of discretion, but the range of dominance among the possible uses of that term is substantial. Justice Marshall
in Curtin Matheson used the term in its general sense of broad authority and
substantial decisionmaking freedom. The proper review of any given exercise of discretion must be guided by the specific nature of the delegated
authority and the intended decisionmaking freedom.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The "well-established principles of administrative law" for defining judicial authority over administrative decisions have not kept up with the massive
changes in administrative law over the several decades since they became
established. The review strategy courts currently are attempting to apply
fails so often, especially in complex review situations, that in reality judges
find little useful guidance from the present system. This article is a call to
reformulate the inquiry; to ask again the basic questions about the proper
allocation of decisionmaking authority between the courts and the bureaucracy; to derive from such questions a more flexible and precise means of
expressing judgments about this allocation.
An improved review system must recognize that any given decision
involves the resolution of a bundle of issues. Each issue in this bundle may
require a separate review strategy. Defining review in minute detail,
depending perhaps on differing substantive questions, is impossible and
hence the review strategy must depend on groupings of issues. This article
identifies issue categories and suggests the proper allocation of decisionmaking authority in each category. In doing so, it relies on various judicial
efforts to shift to an issue-driven review strategy in those cases where the
well-established review principles are not equal to the task. Thus, legal
authority is currently available that will support a shift to an issue-oriented
system. By providing form and support for this emerging review system,
this article offers a foundation for a comprehensive issue-driven review
strategy.

that and other issues but the pivotal issue, whether peanut butter should have 90 percent or
87V• percent peanuts, could not be reviewed.

